In united states v. lopez (1995), the federal governments principal argument was that

United States v. Lopez
Reference: 514 US 549 (1995)
Term: 1994
Important Dates
Argued: Nov 8, 1994 Decided: Apr 26, 1995
Outcome
United States Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit affirmed
Majority
William Rehnquist • Sandra Day O'Connor • Antonin Scalia • Anthony Kennedy • Clarence Thomas
Dissenting
David Souter • John Paul Stevens • Ruth Bader Ginsburg • Stephen Breyer

United States v. Lopez is a case decided on Apr 26, 1995, by the United States Supreme Court. It involved a high school student's conviction for bringing a concealed weapon to his school and the constitutionality of the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990.[1] The Supreme Court ruled 5-4 that the act, which claimed to draw authority from the federal government's power to regulate interstate commerce, overstepped the boundaries of that power and was unconstitutional.[2]

HIGHLIGHTS

In brief: On March 10, 1992, 12th-grade student Alfonso Lopez brought a concealed .38-caliber handgun and five bullets to his high school, where he was arrested based on an anonymous tip. A federal district court sentenced him to six months in prison followed by two years' parole for violating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. Lopez appealed his conviction, which was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit. The Supreme Court then granted certiorari review and ruled 5-4 to affirm the Court of Appeals' ruling that the act was unconstitutional.[2]

Why it matters: The decision marked the first time the Supreme Court had restricted the federal government's power to regulate interstate commerce in several decades.

Background

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Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution reads as follows:

This clause, known as the Commerce Clause, forms the basis of the federal government's power to regulate all interstate commerce. This power was reaffirmed by the decision in Gibbons v. Ogden (1824), in which the Supreme Court ruled that Congress, and not the states, had ultimate authority over navigation. [4]

Oral argument

Oral argument was held on Nov 8, 1994. The case was decided on Apr 26, 1995.[2]

Decision

The Supreme Court ruled 5-4 that the possession of firearms in schools did not fit the definition of interstate commerce, and so the law was unconstitutional.

Chief Justice William Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion and was joined by Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas.

Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion and was joined by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a concurring opinion.

Justices David Souter and John Paul Stevens wrote dissenting opinions. Justice Stephen Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion and was joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, David Souter, and John Paul Stevens.

Opinions

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Opinion of the court

Writing for the Court, Chief Justice William Rehnquist traced the history of Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce, starting from its origin in Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution. The decision in Gibbons v. Ogden, which had affirmed this power, had also acknowledged its limits. In that ruling, Chief Justice John Marshall wrote the following about the enumerated powers of Congress:

Other important cases in the development of interstate commerce jurisprudence, such as United States v. Darby and NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. (1937), had also emphasized the need for clear boundaries. Darby set the precedent that Congress could regulate intrastate activity that had a "substantial effect" on interstate commerce, which would play a key part in United States v. Lopez.[2]

In light of the judicial history of interstate commerce, Chief Justice Rehnquist identified "three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce power."

Rehnquist concluded that the possession of firearms in schools must fall under the third category. He also noted that the historical case law did not provide clear guidelines as to which intrastate activities substantially affected interstate commerce. Several earlier cases, including Wickard v. Filburn, had identified specific examples of such activities. Rehnquist argued that these cases identified a clear pattern, that "Where economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained." Since the Gun-Free School Zones Act was a criminal statute, and possessing a firearm in a school did not constitute an economic activity, he concluded that that activity did not fall under Congressional authority. The Government attempted to argue that firearms in schools could result in violent crime and harm to the educational environment of students, which would indirectly harm the national economy. Rehnquist rejected these arguments, claiming that to accept them would give Congress a "general police power of the sort retained by the States" and would eliminate the distinction between national and local. Here, he echoed the logic of Justice Benjamin Cardozo in his concurring opinion in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States (1935), who had expressed similar concerns about the National Recovery Administration.[2]

Rehnquist concluded that the act overstepped the boundaries of Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce, so the Gun-Free School Zones Act was unconstitutional. This affirmed the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit.[2]

Concurring opinions

Kennedy and O'Connor

In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy expressed a desire to add his own observations to the Court's ruling. He drew two relevant lessons from the history of interstate commerce jurisprudence:

He concluded that the Supreme Court played a critical role in maintaining the system of federalism, of which debates over the boundaries between inter- and intrastate commerce were a critical part. In his view, the Gun-Free School Zones Act represented such a significant intrusion of the federal government into state power that it threatened the balance of federalism. The Court was thus upholding its duty by striking it down.[2]

Thomas

In joining the Court's opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas argued that commerce power jurisprudence had "drifted far from the original understanding of the Commerce Clause" and that in future cases, the Court should make an effort to return to that original understanding. In his view, the substantial effects test set in United States v. Darby could potentially give Congress a general police power, though the majority opinion had held otherwise. He called on the Court to reconsider that test in a future case.[2]

Dissenting opinions

Stevens

In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens argued that Congress' commerce power enabled it not only to prohibit guns in schools, but to prohibit them anywhere.

Souter

In his dissenting opinion, Justice David Souter examined the history of the Supreme Court's deference to Congressional interpretations in cases of interstate commerce. Though the degree of deference had ebbed and flowed over the decades, he felt that in this case the Court was not affording enough respect to Congress' interpretation.[2]

Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and Stephens

Justice Stephen Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion and was joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, David Souter, and John Paul Stevens. In his opinion, Breyer argued that the Gun-Free School Zones Act fell "well within the scope of the commerce power as this Court has understood that power over the last half century." He argued that since the nationwide problem of gun-related violence in school zones constituted a rational basis for Congress' claim that the activity substantially affected interstate commerce, the Court should defer to that interpretation. In his view, the negative impact of gun violence on education hurt the present economy and left many students unprepared for future work in a technologically advanced economy. Adopting this interpretation, he felt, would not expand the definition of interstate commerce, but "simply would apply pre-existing law to changing economic circumstances."[2]

Breyer further argued that the majority opinion was incompatible with earlier cases that had included activities with connections "less significant than the effect of school violence" under the heading of interstate commerce. He found the majority's distinction between commercial and non-commercial overly formalist and believed it would be inadequate for determining which activities actually impacted interstate commerce. Finally, he claimed that the ruling introduced legal uncertainty into the jurisprudence, since many existing laws used the words affecting commerce, a concept which was now left ambiguous.

Impact

In his majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist traced the history of Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce. The ruling in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States (1935) distinguished between activities with direct and indirect effects on interstate commerce, and forbade Congress from regulating those that affected it only indirectly. Only two years later, in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. (1937), the Court took a new direction and held that Congress could regulate intrastate activities with "close and substantial relation to interstate commerce," without regard to their direct or indirect nature. The ruling in Wickard v. Filburn (1942) explicitly rejected the relevance of the distinction between direct and indirect effects, when the Court held that Congress could regulate wheat production. As Rehnquist noted, Wickard v. Filburn signaled a new trend of expansion of Congress' power over interstate commerce. The ruling in United States v. Lopez marked the first major restriction of that power in decades.[2]

Following the decision, the Department of Justice under Attorney General Janet Reno amended the language of the Gun-Free School Zones Act to apply only when to a firearm "that has moved in or that otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce."[5]

See also

• Court cases related to federalism
• Independent federal agency
• Nondelegation doctrine
• Separation of powers
• Rulemaking
• Administrative law
• Supreme Court of the United States
• History of the Supreme Court

External links

• Full Text of the Case via Justia
• Supreme Court of the United States
• Search Google News for this topic

Footnotes

1. ↑ Congress.gov, H.R.3757 - Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, accessed December 14, 2017
2. ↑ 2.00 2.01 2.02 2.03 2.04 2.05 2.06 2.07 2.08 2.09 2.10 2.11 2.12 2.13 Justia, United States v. Lopez, accessed December 14, 2017
3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 Justia, Gibbons v. Ogden, accessed December 14, 2017
5. ↑ Duke Law Journal, THE AMENDED GUN-FREE SCHOOL ZONES ACT: DOUBT AS TO ITS CONSTITUTIONALITY REMAINS, accessed December 14, 2017

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Bibliography	"Administrative Law - The 20th Century Bequeaths an 'Illegitimate Exotic' in Full and Terrifying Flower" by Stephen P. Dresch (2000) "Confronting the Administrative Threat" by Philip Hamburger and Tony Mills (2017) "Constitutionalism after the New Deal" by Cass R. Sunstein (1987) Federalist No. 23 by Alexander Hamilton (1787) "From Administrative State to Constitutional Government" by Joseph Postell (2012) "Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine" by Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule (2002) "Rulemaking as Legislating" by Kathryn Watts (2015) "The Checks & Balances of the Regulatory State" by Paul R. Verkuil (2016) "The Myth of the Nondelegation Doctrine" by Keith E. Whittington and Jason Iuliano (2017) "The Progressive Origins of the Administrative State: Wilson, Goodnow, and Landis" by Ronald J. Pestritto (2007) "The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State" by Gary Lawson (1994) "The Study of Administration" by Woodrow Wilson (1887) "The Threat to Liberty" by Steven F. Hayward (2017) "Why the Modern Administrative State Is Inconsistent with the Rule of Law" by Richard A. Epstein (2008)
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