Land Value Capture and Tax Increment Financing:
overview and considerations for sustainable urban
investment
Type:
Research paper
Abstract:
Background
Cities are expanding relentlessly, often without adequate transport and other infrastructure. Land
Value Capture such as Tax Increment Finance schemes can help plug urban infrastructure gaps and
help reduce carbon emissions. However, a diversity of schemes exists with advantages and
disadvantages but effective LVC implementation needs supporting policy and institutions.
Material and methods
The research conducted a review of LVC and TIF literature and considered three European
examples to illustrate LVC issues and opportunities.
Results
Enhancing the tax take from LVC has several advantages but needs policy and institutional support.
TIF is not a development project funding ‘silver bullet’. It is ineffective where blight or deprivation is
severe. However, if well supported, TIF can help fund regeneration or development projects. The
case studies suggest LVC deployment, in its general and spatially-specific modes, is currently limited
and needs serious consideration.
Conclusions
LVC encompasses a range of instruments. Necessary conditions for LVC extension include policy
learning, institutional strengthening and spatial planning technologies. Without institutional support
and external funding, TIF schemes to regenerate seriously blighted neighborhoods are unlikely to
succeed. TIF supports include expert vetting, baseline scrutiny and independent audits.
Keywords:
sustainable urban development, green taxes, Tax Increment Finance, Land Value Capture, unearned
increment
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Land Value Capture and Tax Increment Financing: overview and
considerations for sustainable urban investment
Abstract
The paper reviews the notion of Land Value Capture (LVC), its advantages and disadvantages and
relevance to for urban growth management. LVC encompasses a wide range of mechanisms,
applied in very diverse contexts to monetize ‘windfall’ gains, accruing to landowners because of
growth, infrastructure or place-making projects. Despite widespread conviction that a proportion
of these ‘unearned increments’ should somehow be harvested for the wider public good,
contention, legal and pragmatic challenges remain. As policy makers confront population
pressures, transport needs and inequality, LVC can help bridge infrastructure funding gaps,
accelerate housing provision and temper polarisation. Betterment taxes, Tax Increment Finance
(TIF) or participatory instruments like land readjustment can target ‘planning gains’ capitalized
into land and property values near stations, historic monuments or upgraded precincts. As well
as flagging instrument diversity and variable contexts, the literature suggests LVC mechanisms
work best in a joined-up policy context. Ironically, spatial LVC schemes like TIF are most likely
to fail when the regeneration need is most acute. In America, inadequate governance, scrutiny or
auditing undermined schemes to fund transport or improve the public realm. In Europe LVC exists
in a variety of modalities but three European examples, suggests it remains underutilized. London
megaprojects, UK regional housing schemes and French sprawl, illustrate that policy makers have
yet to adequately capture unearned increments.
Key Words
Land Value Capture, TIF, LVT, project funding, developer obligations, betterment, unearned
increment, windfall gains, planning gain.
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Introduction: the problem
It is not the fortunes which are earned, but those which are unearned, that it is for the
public good to place under limitation. Mill (1848; V, II V2.14)
The distribution of land and its change of use are almost invariably contentious (Owens
and Cowell 2011). Ever since Pericles (495-429 BCE) regenerated Athens or Nero (37-68 AD)
constructed his Domus Aurea (Golden House), urban development has caused controversy
(Perkins 1956; Ball 2003; Pomeroy, et al. 2004). In modern times, Kuanga et al. (2016) estimate
that over the decade 1990-2010 China’s built area increased by 42,300 km2 (over 25 x London’s
2011 built area). Not only has this land use intensification undermined Chinese food security but
Harrison (2017) alleges that its beneficiaries bribed local officials to secure cheap land leases.
Inevitably, land use alteration or intensification generates winners, who profit from value uplift;
and losers who are disturbed or dispossessed. Even the OECD (2015), acknowledges that the
construction and real estate sectors are prone to mismanagement, corruption and distributive
injustices. Harrison (ibid. 2017) claims that land and property tax injustice corrodes the legitimacy
of current UK fiscal regime. For Mirrlees (2010), the solution is to switch the tax burden from
income toward land, property and other assets.
Advocates of Land Value Capture (LVC) claim the policy instrument can curtail the theft
of public patrimony, increase housing supply, curtail sprawl and attenuate planning disputes. LVC
is not new. In Islam, it is called Kharaj (Lewis 2002; LVTC 2018). Ricardo (1817) advocated
LVC to capture what he called ‘non-functional’ rents, unearned increments or, in general,
excessive returns to capital (Piketty 2013). As its name suggests, LVC impounds a proportion of
the windfall gains accruing to landlords due to general economic conditions or population growth.
LVC also targets betterment gain induced by infrastructure or the relaxation of planning constraints
(Mill 1848; George 1881; Rebelo 2017; Alterman 2012; Hendricks et al. 2017). For Rebelo (2017:
392), LVC supports ‘the economic and financial stability of urban development’. Despite public
conviction that a proportion of these unearned increments should somehow be harvested for the
wider public good, policy, pragmatic and legal challenges remain. Figure 1 illustrates the gamut
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of possible LVC implementation mechanisms. LVC operates at the national level or it recoups
some land value or any increments attributed to public interventions via taxes, services or
participatory contributions. LVC operates via taxation (levied on land value or on development
value uplift from a baseline) or by charging fees or otherwise sharing project benefits. At the
micro-spatial scale, ‘unearned increments’ are captured either fiscally (taxes, fees, exactions) or
via mandatory on-site improvements (participation or fees). Notice within the tax vehicles, the
distinction between Location Value Tax (LVT) and betterment taxes. Unlike property taxes, LVT
disregards the value of buildings or improvements to real estate. Land Value Capture (‘LVC’)
generally targets landowners but mechanisms such as Tax Increment Financing (TIF) widen the
transport or infrastructure beneficiary net (Greenbaum and Landers 2014; Medda and Modelewska
2013). Within the participatory vehicles, Alterman (2012) considers land readjustment the
‘sleeping beauty’ or a sophisticated and malleable mechanism to harvest surplus gains. Alterman
(2012: 767) suggested studying LVC issues in the Britain because ‘vicissitudes with various types
of betterment capture policies make it the world’s most distinctive laboratory’. The LVC research
here investigates a couple of UK cases but its literature review extends to US and the Australian
experiences and French LVC issues are also briefly considered.
[INSERT FIG. 1]
Figure 1: Ov erview of Land Value Capture policy instruments in Macro, Tax or Participatory vehicles
(Source: Autho r, adap ted from Alterman 2012; W orld Bank 2015)
In the UK, property buyers pay Stamp Duty Land Tax (SDLT) on land or property over
thresholds of £125,000 (residential property) or £150,000 (for non-residential land). In Australia,
states levy land taxes with a range of exemptions and varying thresholds (Sayce, 2017). In
America, TIF originated in the 1950s in California with policy initiatives to match federal urban
blight remediation dollars with local contributions. TIF de-risks projects but other measures like
tax breaks or subsidies enhance its effectiveness. TIF enables local governments to issue bonds to
finance for infrastructure / improvements. The bonds are underpinned by hypothecated future
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property tax increases. In the designated project area, future tax streams are ‘ring fenced’. The
TIF funding mechanism involves, first, the legal designation of the scheme and its spatial taxation
zone. Second, the prospective property value uplifts are estimated and then consequential
incremental municipal tax revenues are capitalised to secure mortgage finance. A TIF effectively
strengthens future property tax revenues covenants to enable local authorities to borrow money for
necessary (sustainable) infrastructure projects. The downside risk is that projected property value
increases fail to materialise - either because the project fails or the macro-cyclical climate alters.
For Carroll (2008), TIF provides useful rehabilitation tool. For her, the long-term benefits of
revitalization and property inflation outweigh tax revenue restrictions. Figure 2 below illustrates
the TIF mechanism.
[INSERT FIG. 2]
TIF mechanics (Source: Lefco e 2011: 457)
Be that as it may, successful TIF implementation imposes three conditions. First, baseline
analysis should not only demonstrate blight or a local need (betterment or affordable housing) but
also business rates and property prices in the TIF area (‘redline area’). To test whether
regeneration via a TIF is really necessary, invokes a ‘but for’ test (Greenhalgh et al. 2012).
Collected financial and valuation baseline data underpins prudent modelling of estimated
incremental TIF income (i.e. excluding ‘displacements’ or establishments likely to relocate to
avoid tax hikes). As new facts emerge, computations are updated. The second condition for
successful TIF schemes is enabling (or TIF authorising) legislation to clarify contractual terms and
circumscribe the spatial boundaries of the TIF. Finally, TIF success presupposes central and local
government involvement both in approval and in management. Whilst many municipalities resent
intrusive oversight, Squires and Hutchison (2014) investigation of Californian schemes found
Regional Development Agency support critical both to independently vet projects and to properly
manage tax receipts earmarked for affordable housing or sustainable regeneration.
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Advantages
LVC comes in many forms. The arguments for LVC expansion on economic, strategic,
fiscal and equity grounds seem impelling. Economically, such taxes improve resource allocation.
In California during the 1940s-50s and again in the 80-90s, TIF financed redevelopment helped
reverse inner city decay. Recently, the UK Government considered introducing some form of LVT
to incentivise home construction (Wilson et al. 2017). Privatising the social housing stock has led
to a massive surge in sub-standard Private Rented Sector accommodation (rogue landlords), who
are effectively subsidised to the tune of over twenty six billion by the public purse (Shelter 2017).
LVT could help solve the UK’s affordable housing crisis but it also mitigates sprawl. Strategically
and financially, LVC provides a pragmatic funding solution for regeneration or resilience and
carbon mitigating infrastructure (Granoff et al. 2016). In the UK, TfL and GLA (2017) advocate
the TIF mechanism to bridge the infrastructure funding gap.
In the past, general taxation has funded the gap (...)[but] as the funding requirement grows,
without alternative funding sources, there is no obvious way of paying for major network upgrades
and extensions, other than increasing the burden on general taxation. Land value capture (LVC)
is one such alternative funding source. (TfL and GLA 2017: p6)
Research by Savills and KPMP for London’s mayor estimated that investment of £36bn on
eight Transport for London projects, including Crossrail 2, the Bakerloo line extension and the
Dockland Light Railway extension, could produce land value uplifts of about £87bn (TfL and GLA
2017: p7). It seems right that homeowners who benefit from such infrastructure via shorter
commutes and property uplift should help fund it. Caroll (2008) found that within TIF district
public service enhancement is capitalized into business property value. Man and Rosentraub
(1998) found transport infrastructure inflated property values in Indiana by 11%. In Australia,
McIntosh et al. (2015) found that LVC schemes can raise significant funding for public
transportation or Transit Oriented Developments (TODs). However, homeowners in the
catchment often complain that the tax is unfair or excessive compared to benefits. To counter this
charge, the California Constitution Article (CVI, s16; Proposition 13 1978) capped property tax
rates at one percent (plus enough to repay bonded indebtedness). Valuations could only be
increased following a change in ownership or new construction except for an annual across-the-
board inflation adjustment of 2%—but only if inflation equalled or exceeded that level. Even this
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tightening though failed to stop complaints and, in 1993, further legislation restricted Californian
TIF programmes to affordable housing or areas which met strict ‘blighted’ criteria. İn 2011,
California Governor Jerry Brown ended TIF for redevelopment and handed over TIF revenue
management to external bodies. Notwithstanding the mixed US picture, Squires and Hutchison
(2014) point out that TIF schemes played an important role in financing affordable housing.
In England, there is some appetite for UK TIF (Wilson et al. 2017) but still disagreement on
management aspects particularly among local authorities (‘LA’s’). TIFs were ushered in by the
Local Government Finance Act 2012. Whilst LA’s are enthusiastic about TIF unlocking
regeneration, they have reservations about TIF in blighted areas because, even with uplift in values,
Business Rates are unlikely to recoup project costs. Councils also demand assurance that TIF
offers value for money compared to ‘in-house’ government financing. Notwithstanding, any
regeneration projects must also overcome usual planning contentions about surrounding impacts.
Notable Scottish TIF projects include:
Glasgow City Region City Deal will see £1.13 billion infrastructure spend to 2035, hoping
to leverage £3bn private investment.
Edinburgh Waterfront is a mixed residential/commercial development in Leith. Council
invested £84m.
Ravenscraig in North Lanarkshire aims to regenerate its blighted steelworks. More than
£200m has been invested, including £70m for a college £32m for a sports facility but hopes
for another £425m from Wilson Bowden and other private investors.
Buchanan Galleries where Glasgow City Council invested £80m to redevelop the
Buchanan Quarter, hoping to leverage £310m from Land Securities and Henderson Global
Investors.
Disadvantages
In her empirical international review, Alterman (2012) found ‘messy’ negotiated LVC
imposts or planning obligations have proliferated whist elegant direct-capture approaches faltered
mainly because these indirect LVC tools provide a pragmatic mechanisms to fund public services.
However, this really indicates policy failing. Even with so-called indirect capture instruments,
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landowners and developers face an impost lottery and the risk of a local political backlash or legal
challenges. For end-users, the betterment quid pro quo is also unpredictable.
In recent times, government and media attention has focused on TIF but this territorial
LVC instrument has significant disadvantages, including loss of control, risk shifting, cycles and
the deprivation paradox. In terms of control, TIF critics point out that that local governments
effectıvely lose control over some property tax income. Once an area is declared a redevelopment
project area, the share of property taxes that goes to schools and other local agencies is frozen. All
ex post property taxes growth in the designated zone flows back to the redevelopment agency.
Money for schools, water or sewage etc. upgrades is ‘siphoned off’ for redevelopment projects.
TIF detractors argue that TIF developers shift risk onto the public sector. Factors
increasing contention between private and public risk sharing include wrangling over spatial decay
of beneficial spillovers, ill-considered institutional structures or lack of legal clarity around roles
and responsibilities. Any injections of public equity investment into a scheme should bring more
effective control. In California, concerns over lack of TIF control and risk shifting resulted in two
bills in June 2011 which curtailed TIF redevelopment agencies. Before Proposition 13 in
California tax assessors routinely adjusted tax assessed values to current fair market value. In
housing booms, homeowners were burdened with huge property tax hikes. A tax revolt was
sparked by property tax increases in 1975-77, with house prices climbing 28% in 1977 alone. In
such a frothy market, Proposition 13 cut ballooning property tax bills and ended TIF agencies. It
also outlined a TIF dissolution process. However, TIF agencies who funded schools were
reprieved. Redevelopment agencies and cities sued, claiming these bills were unconstitutional.
The court decided California could quash TIF redevelopment agencies but without any
exemptions. The third disadvantage of LVC schemes like TIF relates to financial or real estate
market assumptions and forecasting uncertainties for baseline residual land valuations, fair values
or estimates of worth. In London and Manchester, contention around urban land values has
bedevilled feasibility assessments or viability” appraisals for affordable housing (Cocksedge
2018). If development has been mooted for many years but not formalised in a scheme, baseline
assessments become questionable. Often when project knowledge becomes public, markets react
and capitalise growth. Other cyclical concerns involve estimates of yields or discount rates,
anticipated market conditions, take up by anchor tenants and projected commercial rents
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(Jadevicius and Huston 2017). Finally, accordıng to Lefcoe (2011: 443), ‘TIF is an ineffect ua l
tool for assisting most seriously blighted areas’ essentially because investors are unwilling to throw
good money after bad. This deprivation paradox really is a pretty serious indictment of spatially-
based LVC instruments since where schemes are most acutely needed to address spatial injustice
and attenuate polarisation, they struggle with funding.
Case studies
Having reviewed a range of literature, the research reflects on LVC issues and opportunities by
briefly considering three European case studies in UK and France.
UK London (Nine Elms)
Inequality and fragmentation in the UK housing market manifests most grotesquely in London
where in recent times megaprojects like Nine Elms, Kings Cross and Olympic Park and Crossrail
have transformed the capital (Edwards 2009). The £13 billion (US$15.9 billion) Nine Elms
regeneration project of 227 hectares on the South Bank of the River Thames is illustrated in Fig.
3.
[INSERT FIG. 3]
Figure 3: Nine elms development b oun daries (Wand swort h council 2017)
The regeneration scheme extends from Lambeth Bridge in the north, to Chelsea Bridge in the
south, covering the Albert Embankment, Vauxhall and a large slice of north Battersea.
Westminster lies directly opposite on the north bank of the Thames. It is by far the largest
regeneration zone in central London and has transformed the last remaining industrial stretch of
the South Bank. Curiously, in Nine Elms no Tax Increment Financing mechanism captured land
value uplift although the Section 106 funding and Community Infrastructure Levy did recoup some
of the uplift for the community. In fact, landowners partially funded initial works with off-plan
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sales but major extensions to the underground effectively subsidised revitalisation. The Northern
Line Extension (NLE) project extended the underground from Kennington to Battersea and built
two stations at Nine Elms and at Battersea. In contrast to the Kings Cross regeneration scheme,
Despite the vision, Nine Elms provides limited pubic spinoffs in terms of cycle ways and green
space and effectively remains a privileged enclave (GLA 2012).
UK Region: Cirencester Chesterton Development
Regional UK settlements are under intense pressure to increase housing supply but with very
limited supportive infrastructure funding. Cirencester in the Cotswolds, one hour west of Oxford,
is a typical example. Its recent Draft Local Plan, has approved a strategic site in Chesterton south
of the town to provide most of the Cotswold District council (CDC) thirty year supply of housing
(CDC 2018). The beneficiaries of CDC’s housing supply centralisation are the site landowner and
wealthy homeowners in outlying villages who not only avoid congestion and other externalities
but are also likely to surreptitiously reap unearned increments in housing value. So rather than
being sustainable, the plan is quite the opposite from a social perspective. Interestingly, the voting
pattern of local councillors on the Plan reflects these vested interests. Cirencester Town’s concerns
about the inappropriate scale of the scheme and lack of connective infrastructure were largely
ignored despite public relations claims to involve the community in shaping the future (Jessel
2018).
[INSERT FIG 4]
Chesterton M asterplan 2015 (Source: Bathurst Develop ment Ltd)
France: Regional fragmentation
Like many countries, France faces a challenge to spread the impacts of globalisation and logistic
concentration to its regions. The challenge is most acute in rural departments like the Lot and
Corrèze, particularly at the interfaces of such regional administrations where weak strategy and
lack of coordination compound the inherent tension between real estate growth and the need for
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sustainable territorial management. An excellent milieu to study the phenomenon of globally-
induced real estate sprawl is the settlement of Beaulieu sur Dordogne which spills over towards
Bretenoux, Biars, Glanes and St. Céré. Over the past twenty years since 1998, the number of
dwellings in Cere-Dordogne river valley conurbation area has risen dramatically, despite relatively
static population (INSEE 2018). Two mechanisms drive the process of anthropogenic
intensification; first is the expansion of industrial and logistics operations around Biars sur Cère
and the presences of a large multinational food conglomerate such as Andros. Second is the spread
of second and retirement properties by French or overseas investors. Figure 5 illustrates how the
workers or retirees cluster in locales with views over heritage artefacts like the Château de
Castelneau.
[INSERT FIG. 5]
New hous ing s prawl in Cere-Dord ogne riv er valley conurb ation 2018 (Source: Author)
Discussion
The literature review and the three case studies provides a rounded, if somewhat
empirically limited, review of LVC. LVC can be implemented via national vehicles or more
spatially-targeted with either imposts on values, betterment charges, fees or participation in project
gains. Many local municipalities face tight budget pressures and TIF schemes present them with
an innovative place-making, redevelopment or infrastructure funding tool to improve project
feasibility, cut government outlays and spread risk. However, the TIF conundrum is that it
generally works best for attractive projects in locales which have been overlooked but not in
seriously blighted areas with significant social problems. Target projects need careful vetting to
ensure suburban shopping malls which encourage sprawl and displace trade from city centres are
excluded. To help ensure successful TIF implementation, careful consideration needs to be given
to TIF project institutional structure (TIF Corporations) and public and private project
collaboration. To catalyse useful projects, government land can be gifted or the legislative powers
of resumption exercised. In terms of institutional collaboration, local planning authorities must
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develop credible bundled infrastructure and services plans so that the risk/reward credentials of
TIF bond issues become acceptable to banks, pension funds and overseas investors.
Regarding TIF schemes, specific considerations include:
Sound institutional framework for territorial development. Spatial planning coordination
provides legal clarity, champions the public interest and vets TIF sites/projects properly to
exclude commercial development without public good merit
Regional planning bodies and TIF corporations require talented, motivated and ethical
administrative staff
Extensive local consultation is required to ensure TIF projects do not drain property tax
revenues from schools or other important local commitments.
Independent oversight to vet and financial scrutiny to audit projects
Seriously blighted locales with compromised prospects require alternative funding streams
and inter-agency support to de-risk projects and catalyse regeneration
Conclusion
Sustainable urban development calls for significant investment in public transport,
walkable precincts, cycle ways and carbon-reducing infrastructure generally to enhance or to
protect / remediate ecologically sensitive areas. One way to fund the green infrastructure gap is
Land Value Capture which comes in many guises. As well a diversity of mechanisms, the literature
suggests that Land Value Capture has advantages and disadvantages but needs institutional
territorial and spatial planning support. Context variability precludes a standardised application
across projects, locales and jurisdictions. Whilst TIF can finance infrastructure for upmarket
malls, gated housing or other commercially lucrative but fossil-fuel dependent projects it fails
without subsidies where it is most needed to overcome serious blight, deprivation or isolation. In
such depleted locales, non-spatial (general revenue) imposts or borrowings must supplement
territorially raised LVC finance for infrastructure or regeneration. Generalised LVC instruments
like a land tax could help redress unbalanced tax systems and attenuate wealth inequality. Fiscal
policy reform aside, LVC also requires sound territorial policy and robust institutions. LVC
operational supports involve spatial data and technologies, comprehensive land registration, inter-
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governmental collaboration, expert scrutiny, authentic consultation with local residents, regular
financial viability reviews and independent audits.
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Figure 1
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Figure 1: Overview of LVC policy instruments
(Source: Author, adapted from Alterman 2012; World Bank 2015)
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Figure 2
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Figure 2: TIF mechanics (Source: Lefcoe 2011: 457)
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Figure 3
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Figure 3: Nine elms development boundaries (Wandsworth council 2017)
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Figure 4
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Figure 4: Chesterton Masterplan 2015 (Source: Bathurst Development Ltd)
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Figure 5
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Figure 5: New housing sprawl in Cere-Dordogne river valley conurbation 2018 (Source:
Author)
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Figures
Figure 1 - Download source file (19.73 kB)
Figure 1: Overview of LVC policy instruments
(Source: Author, adapted from Alterman 2012; World Bank 2015)
Figure 2 - Download source file (57.97 kB)
Figure 2: TIF mechanics (Source: Lefcoe 2011: 457)
Figure 3 - Download source file (430.38 kB)
Figure 3: Nine elms development boundaries (Wandsworth council 2017)
Figure 4 - Download source file (1.33 MB)
Figure 4: Chesterton Masterplan 2015 (Source: Bathurst Development Ltd)
Figure 5 - Download source file (187.4 kB)
Figure 5: New housing sprawl in Cere-Dordogne river valley conurbation 2018 (Source:
Author)
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