Which classified level is given to information that could reasonably be expected to cause serious damage to national security?

Officials removed a cache of documents from former President Donald Trump's Mar-A-Lago residence in Palm Beach, Fla., last week. Giorgio Viera/AFP via Getty Images hide caption

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Giorgio Viera/AFP via Getty Images

Officials removed a cache of documents from former President Donald Trump's Mar-A-Lago residence in Palm Beach, Fla., last week.

Giorgio Viera/AFP via Getty Images

When the FBI searched former President Donald Trump's Mar-a-Lago resort last week, agents seized 11 sets of classified documents, including ones marked "Top Secret," court filings show.

The actual contents of those documents are unknown, but they included some from each of the government's security classification levels: confidential, secret and top secret. They also included a less familiar designation: TS/SCI, meaningtop secret/sensitive compartmented information.

These classification levels refer to the documents and the level of security clearance an individual needs to access them. The levels also rise in order according to how much damage the unauthorized disclosure of the information could do, Mark Zaid, an attorney specializing in national security,told NPR.

"If there is an unauthorized disclosure of confidential information, it could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the national security of the United States," Zaid said. "At a secret level, unauthorized disclosure is expected to cause serious damage. And for the top secret level, unauthorized disclosure is expected to cause exceptionally grave damage."

The property receipt unsealed with the search warrant shows that of the documents seized, four sets of documents were classified as top secret, three more sets were classified as secret, and three other sets were classified as confidential.

The remaining setwas classified as TS/SCI.

The top secret/sensitive compartmented information is not a separate classification level

The SCI abbreviation is an added specifier that can refer to a singular asset, program or project or the way in which the information contained in the document was collected, Zaid said. Not everyone with top-secret clearance would be able to view a TS/SCI document — they would need to have clearance for the specific SCI designation.

"When you talk about, for example, issues dealing with operational activities of covert case officers, identities of informants and assets ... that's when you start to get far more into the TS and SCI world," Zaid said.

Not everyone with top-secret clearance can view TS/SCI material

Heoften compares the security levels to keys to a house. Those with a confidential clearance have the lowest level of access similar to a key that would open the front door. Those with secret clearance would be able to go down to the basement with another key. And then only those with top-secret clearance would have another key to the utility room. Once inside the utility room, those with theTS/SCI designation would only have keys to certain safes or boxes that correspond to their specified project or asset.

Zaid said he represents a lot of clients who mistakenly take home documents that are classified when they're retiring or a similar situation, but keeping materials classified as TS/SCI is a much bigger deal.

People who work in the national security sector at any level know that they should not keep documents labeled TS/SCI, Zaid said. "To have so many classified documents that, at least according to the warrant receipt, [are] properly marked raises so many red flags," he said.

Before coming to academia, I worked for many years as an analyst at both the State Department and the Department of Defense.

I held a top secret clearance, frequently worked with classified information and participated in classified meetings. Classified information is that which a government or agency deems sensitive enough to national security that access to it must be controlled and restricted. For example, I dealt with information related to weapons of mass destruction and their proliferation.

Handling written classified information is generally straightforward. Documents are marked indicating classification levels. It is sometimes more difficult to remember, however, whether specific things heard or learned about in meetings or oral briefings are classified. Government employees sometimes reveal classified details accidentally in casual conversations and media interviews. We may not hear about it because it’s not in the interviewee’s or employee’s interest to point it out after the fact, or he or she may not even realize it at the time.

In 1991, Sen. David Boren accidentally revealed the name of a clandestine CIA agent during a news conference. At the time, Boren was no less than chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

Not all revelations of classified details are earth-shattering, like nuclear launch codes. Many are are rather mundane. A former colleague of mine who was a retired CIA analyst used to tell his students he would never knowingly, but almost certainly would inadvertently, share a tidbit of classified information in the classroom. It is very difficult to remember many “smaller” details that are sensitive.

Dealing with large amounts of classified information over a career increases the possibility of accidentally sharing a small nugget. Sharing classified information knowingly, or revealing information one should know is sensitive, is a different matter.

Here’s how the system of classification works.

Classification levels and content

The U.S. government uses three levels of classification to designate how sensitive certain information is: confidential, secret and top secret.

The lowest level, confidential, designates information that if released could damage U.S. national security. The other designations refer to information the disclosure of which could cause “serious” (secret) or “exceptionally grave” (top secret) damage to national security.

At the top secret level, some information is “compartmented.” That means only certain people who have a top secret security clearance may view it. Sometimes this information is given a “code word” so that only those cleared for that particular code word can access the information. This is often used for the most highly sensitive information.

There are several other designators that also indicate restricted access. For example, only those holding a secret or top secret clearance, and the critical nuclear weapon design information designation, are allowed to access information related to many aspects of the operation and design of nuclear weapons.

It is common for written documents to contain information that is classified at different levels, including unclassified information. Individual paragraphs are marked to indicate the level of classification. For example, a document’s title might be preceded with the marker (U) indicating the title and existence of the document is unclassified.

Within a document, paragraphs might carry the markers “S” for secret, “C” for confidential or “TS” for top secret. The highest classification of any portion of the document determines its overall classification. This approach allows for the easy identification and removal of classified portions of a document so that less sensitive sections can be shared in unclassified settings.

Not quite confidential

Below the confidential level, there are varying terms for information that is not classified but still sensitive.

Government agencies use different terms for this category of information. The State Department uses the phrase “sensitive but unclassified,” while the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security use “for official use only.” These markers are often seen in the headers and footers of documents just like classified designations.

Who decides?

Executive Order 13256 spells out who specifically may classify information.

Authority to take certain pieces of information, say the existence of a weapons program, and classify it top secret is given only to specific individuals. They include the president and vice president, agency heads and those specifically designated by authorities outlined in the executive order.

Procedures for declassification of materials are complicated. They are delineated in Executive Order 12356. However, the president has ultimate declassification authority and may declassify anything at any time.

Deciding what information is classified is subjective. Some things clearly need to be kept secret, like the identity of covert operatives or battle plans. Other issues are not as obvious. Should the mere fact that the secretary of state had a conversation with a counterpart be classified? Different agencies disagree about issues like this all the time.

In practice, when people leave the government they often engage in media interviews, write books and have casual conversations. There are bound to be complications and revelations – accidental or otherwise.

Which classification level is given to information that could reasonably be expected to cause serious damage to?

Which type of information could reasonably expected to cause serious damage to national security?

Which type if information could reasonably be expected to cause serious damage to national security if disclosed without authorization?

What are the 3 levels of classified information?