What are the theories of distributive justice?

Meritocracy as Equity

Distributive justice involves people's evaluations of the fairness of the allocation of desirable outcomes across people. Deutsch (1975), in his influential summary of distributive justice, distinguished three basic principles that people endorse as fair depending on the particular social goals that are relevant to a particular relationship or social context (see Tyler and Smith, 1998). The principle of equality calls for the equal distribution of resources and is widely endorsed as the default principle in social settings were cooperation and harmony are primary goals. Need calls for unequal distribution of resources such that those who are most in need receive the larger portions. This principle is seen as appropriate where the goals are social welfare and responsibility. The principle of equity also calls for an unequal distribution of resources but holds that the ratio of any individual's inputs to outcomes should be equivalent to the same ratio of the person or persons with whom the individual is being compared. In other words, each individual should receive resources in proportion to their relative contributions. Some theorists have held that equity can be understood to be the general principle of distributive justice (see Adams, 1965; Walster et al., 1973). In fact, among some economists equity and justice are entirely conflated such that ‘equitable’ is synonymous with ‘fair.’ Although most social psychologists would see these as overstatements, equity is widely accepted as the preferred distributive justice principle in economic and competitive contexts (see Tyler, 2014). Thus, in capitalistic cultures such as North American (and perhaps other ‘Western’ nations), which focus heavily on competitive and economic relationships, the principle of equity (merit) is applied across a wide range of domains including educational, economic, political, organizational, and interpersonal.

While equality and need are inconsistent with meritocracy, the principle of equity serves as the primary justification for meritocracy. That is, a meritocracy is a system in which the principle of equity is upheld and it is generally believed that if individuals are talented enough or invest enough effort, they will receive a greater share of system resources and will advance up the social ladder. Given the relative ubiquity of equity as the preferred justice principle in individualistic/capitalistic cultures, it is perhaps not surprising that meritocracy has been described as America's ‘dominant ideology’ (Kluegel and Smith, 1986; McNamee and Miller, 2009). However, the recognition that equity is only one of at least three possible justice principles provides a basis for understanding why meritocracy, even when it is actually realized, can be rejected as unfair. For example, although we might find very few North American students who would reject meritocracy at the approach for distributing grades (a valued resource), we might find more variance in the endorsement of meritocracy as the primary strategy for distributing a professor's time. While the best students might garner some additional attention, most would likely agree that a teacher's time should also be distributed more equally or perhaps on the basis of need. Thus, despite the strong support for meritocracy as a guiding cultural worldview, there remain contexts where meritocracy can be rejected in favor of another form for distributive justice.

Interactional Justice

Distributive and procedural justice has received the most attention in the literature. But since the mid-1980s, theory and research have also emphasized the importance of the social and informal aspects of justice in daily encounters (Bies and Moag, 1986; Greenberg, 1993; Mikula et al., 1990). Greenberg (1993) pointed out the importance of considering interactional justice in justice theorizing and distinguished between interpersonal and informational justice as two forms of interactional justice. This has subsequently been supported by Colquitt et al. (2001; see also Colquitt, 2001). There is however some controversy concerning whether or not interactional justice should be subsumed under the broader concept of procedural justice (Bies, 2005; Bobocel and Holmvall, 2001). Procedural and interactional justice may constitute aspects of ‘fairness of treatment’ (Van den Bos, 2005).

While procedural justice is related to the formal and structural aspects (i.e., rules and policies), interpersonal justice concerns the quality of the relationship or the exchange and social processes taking place between people. Just as distributive and procedural justice is defined in terms of a number of criteria or principles, interpersonal justice is defined in terms of four main criteria: respect, truthfulness, justification, and propriety (Bies and Moag, 1986). Information justice refers to how allocation decisions or enacted procedures are explained to those concerned – the type of information given or how it is given to the individuals. This gives the impression of neutrality and increases people's trust in the authorities. Research on information justice and its effects are very scarce (see Kazemi and Törnblom, 2009).

Distributive Justice

Distributive justice refers to the perceived fairness of an allocation or, more broadly, to how people judge what they receive. It was probably the first type of justice to gain the attention of organizational justice scholars and continues to receive wide attention. In general, there are three rules that people can use to decide whether or not their outcomes are fair – equity, equality, and need (Deutsch, 1985).

Equity allocations treat a fair allocation as one that pays individuals in accordance with their contributions. There are different models of equity – Aristotle even had one – but by far the most influential is Adams' (1965) equity theory. According to Adams, individuals calculate equity comparing two outcome/input ratios. The first ratio is their own outcomes divided by their own inputs, while the second is a referent's outcomes divided by the referent's inputs. In order for equity to exist, these two ratios should match. A counterintuitive prediction of equity theory is that people care about overreward, as well as underreward. If an individual's ratio is larger than that of a referent person, this means that the individual has greater outcomes given his or her inputs. In such a circumstance, Adams found that the individual will attempt to restore equity by either raising performance (if pay is fixed) or lowering performance (if pay is piece rate). In general, equity theory has received support, including predictions for overreward. But it is not the whole story.

An equality allocation provides everyone with the same amount, without regard to contributions. Equality allocations are most likely to be used when the goal is to maximize group harmony; equity allocations are most common when the goal is to maximize productivity. As such, equality is relatively common among close, communal groups. There is some evidence that equality, as opposed to equity, is also preferred when decision making is allocating something negative, such as budget cuts. If we must share suffering, it seems that individuals often prefer to suffer by the same amount or percentage. Interestingly, equality may also have an information processing advantage, as it is a very simple allocation rule that requires less effortful thought than others. In this regard, researchers have documented the existence of an equality heuristic, whereby people simply divide things evenly unless they have the cognitive resources to consider a more complex norm (such as equity).

A third allocation rule is need, which provides outcomes on the basis of a perceived deficit. Perhaps surprisingly, need allocations have been less widely studied in the organizational sciences, although even profit-making firms make at least some use of them. For instance, family leave policies are allocated to those who need them – only people with particular needs (e.g., child care or elder care) receive time off.

In practice, when people are asked to make allocation decision, they often mix the rules together, such that they are not always used in a pure form (Cugueró-Escofet and Rosanas, 2013). For example, one strategy might be to provide ‘necessities’ or a minimum income to all. This would be an equality allocation. However, above this equal minimum the equity rule could be employed. In this regard, one might use merit to allocate additional payments. Another mixed approach might be to allocate different goods in different ways. Among American employers, for example, socioemotional goods indicative of group standing are often allocated equally, whereas economic goods are often allocated through equity (Chen, 1995). These and other sorts of mixed approaches seek to balance the strengths and weaknesses of the different allocation rules.

Distributive Justice

Theories of distributive justice seek to allocate society's resources on the basis of just principles. The process of determining such principles is the focus of considerable debate. Many theories incorporate utilitarian and Lockean principles. In perhaps, the most influential work on distributive justice of the past century, Rawls (1971) offers an ‘ideal contractarian’ theory of distributive shares in which a just allocation of benefits and burdens of social life is determined by what rational persons would choose from behind a ‘veil of ignorance,’ which prevents them from knowing what abilities, desires, parentage, or social stratum they would occupy. Rawls concludes that people behind such a veil would adopt what he calls the ‘difference principle’: ‘primary goods’ – not only wealth, income, and opportunity, but also bases of self-respect – would be distributed to the maximal advantage of a representative member of the least advantaged social class. Rawls (1993) emphasizes that the difference principle does not call for simple egalitarianism but rather measures to assure that “the basic needs of all citizens can be met so that they can take part in political and social life.”

Property Rights and Distributive Justice

As for arguments from distributive justice, these arguments are mainly used to assess alternative distributions of these rights if a system of property rights is already in place. They do not primarily aim to solve the general problem of justifying the institution of property rights as such. However, theories of just distribution can incorporate considerations about efficiency (as is the case in Rawls’s difference principle), and these considerations may, given empirical knowledge about the expectable effects of alternative systems of property rights, render some of these systems superior to others. Independent from such empirical knowledge, accounts of distributive justice seem compatible with a wide spectrum of different definitions of property rights; but insofar as the realization of just distributions will probably require recurrent interferences with the outcome of unrestricted market exchange, it will not be compatible with a libertarian notion of property rights that excludes any such interferences.

Contractualism and Asymmetry

Contemporary discussions of distributive justice are synonymous with the resurgence of contractarian thinking under the influence of philosophers such as Rawls (1971) and Gauthier (1986). The contract device is used for thinking about distributive questions in circumstances where the parties disagree about ultimate moral principles. If we cannot base our obligations to one another by appeal to a common standard such as utility maximization, we can use the idea of a rational bargain or reasonable agreement as the basis for distributive norms and obligations. The idea of a contract is a thought experiment that can be used to legitimize principles rather than an actual agreement process that groups of people have to collectively engage in. However, even as a hypothetical device the idea of a contract (in both versions of the theory) poses a major problem because of the asymmetrical relation between the participants in intergenerational cases.

The ‘mutual advantage’ theory argues that distributive principles can be derived from a rational bargain between participants in a cooperative venture, such as market society or political community. The issue of justice only arises when certain circumstances of justice obtain. If each individual could get everything they wanted without cooperation there would be no need for principles of justice. The circumstances of justice are threefold. First, (roughly) equal power among the parties. What one lacks in strength they can make up in guile so no one is guaranteed always getting their own way. Second, moderate scarcity of goods and motivations obtains, so that social cooperation is necessary or at least in the interest of all. Finally, while all benefit from the existence of social cooperation, the participants are interested in the distribution of its benefits and burdens. As rational agents each has an interest to maximize their share of the benefits but minimize their share of the burdens of cooperation.

The problem for the ‘mutual advantage’ theorist is that the circumstances of justice do not unequivocally obtain between noncontinuous generations. If we use the idea of the contract within one generation we can make sense of the idea of rough equality of power and reciprocity as the key motivations for accepting the distribution of the benefits and burden of social cooperation (although we might still argue that this is a morally inappropriate way to think about justice). Yet when we extend this idea to noncontinuous generations the weakness of the method becomes apparent. In what way can we both speak of ourselves and future generations as part of the same ‘cooperative’ venture? If we just concentrate on the rough equality of power we can see how there is an asymmetrical relation between the generations. Take an issue such as energy policy. A present generation can unilaterally impose significant costs on future generations such as the management of toxic or nuclear wastes. I leave aside a further case where the consequences of a present decision are so egregious as to prevent there being a future generation. Does stopping potential people coming into existence constitute a harm or injustice? It is clearly possible for a present generation to take such choices without any possible negative consequences from the future generation except perhaps disapproval and poor historical reputation. The present generation is able unilaterally to affect the interests of a future generation, whereas a future generation cannot unilaterally affect the interests of the present generation, hence the asymmetry. Without rough equality of bargaining power any contractual agreement will simply reflect the advantage of the stronger party, in this case the present generation. If this is so, the contract does nothing more than allow the present generation to pursue its own interests taking account of the future only when its own reputation is at stake and when this is of higher value than any other present interest such as standard of living. Because of the asymmetrical relationship underlying an agreement it is unclear how the present generation could be motivated to assume obligations to the future given the motivational assumptions of ‘mutual advantage’ contractarianism. The contract not only does not generate obligations to the future, but would appear to generate reasons for ignoring such claims.

The ‘impartialist’ theory departs from many of the key features of the ‘mutual advantage’ bargain just considered. Rawls' theory introduces the idea of a hypothetical original position in which the participants deciding which principles of justice should shape the basic structure of their society as a fair system of social cooperation, are shrouded by a ‘veil of ignorance.’ The point of the veil of ignorance is to filter out the possibility of exploiting ‘positional’ advantage or inequalities of bargaining power. By denying agents behind the veil of ignorance, information about their particular circumstances and goals, and allowing them only general knowledge about society, Rawls constructs an impartial choice situation. Rational self-interest plus ignorance delivers impartiality and fairness.

Rawls' theory is a thought experiment designed to test the fairness of candidate principles of justice. The contract with the veil of ignorance is designed to model a fair choice situation. However, once again the asymmetry problem arises. The agents behind the ‘veil or ignorance’ are denied information that will prevent them from pursuing their own interests at the expense of each other. The agreement is effectively between members of a single generation. What is to stop the participants choosing principles in order to maximize the condition of the worst off currently in existence that will at the same time worsen the situation of those not yet born? In order to bring future generations into the agreement Rawls posits an additional motive for the participants. They are expected to reason as representatives of families who are assumed to have a concern for their descendants. Heads of families provide the intergenerational link that overcomes the asymmetrical relations between future generations. The problem with this strategy is that it merely concedes the problem of asymmetry and the inability of the contract device to generate adequate obligations to the future. At best the additional motivational assumption gives those in the present generation a reason to take account of future generations. It does not establish an obligation to future generations in the way that the contract does establish obligations within one generation. The addition of the extra motivational assumption provides a noncontractarian reason for taking account of future generations. In effect it assumes precisely what it is supposed to provide, namely a reason for taking account of the interests of future generations.

While contractarian arguments have been central to the development of current theories of distributive justice, they seem singularly ill-equipped to deal with issues of justice between generations because of the asymmetrical relationship between even hypothetical bargainers. This is a point acknowledged by Barry, one of the most significant defenders of a neo-Rawlsian contractarianism (in Dobson, 1998b). The key relationship of reciprocity and the equal ability of the partners to affect the interests of each other do not apply in the case of temporally noncontinuous generations. To overcome this, the contractarian has to appeal to noncontractarian reasons.

Justice

A basic principle of distributive justice that appears to be violated in much biomedical experimentation is that burdens and benefits ought to be fairly shared. Significant empirical evidence can be compiled which indicates that such equitable sharing has not been a feature of experimentation so that the vulnerable have historically carried significant burdens without receiving proportionate compensating benefits in return, and those who reaped the benefits have not always contributed proportionately to research. For instance, throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, impoverished ward patients were involved in much human experimentation, yet the benefits that followed from this research in terms of improved health care generally flowed to relatively well-off private patients. In more recent times, similar issues have arisen with respect to research undertaken in developing countries. Such research is often intended to benefit those in the developed world rather than the developing one, and for reasons of expense or inadequate healthcare infrastructure, there may be no realistic prospect for any benefits obtained through research to be extended after a trial to those communities from which the participants were drawn.

The Belmont Report, written in the wake of Tuskegee, introduced the notion of vulnerability into discussions of research ethics by connecting it to justice. The Report complained that it was unjust to select and recruit participants for research simply based on administrative ease, convenience, and “their ready availability in settings where research is conducted” rather than according to good scientific criteria – that is, their suitability in terms of the study and its research goals. Participants in the Tuskegee study seem to have fallen victim to this particular form of injustice because they provided an ‘unusual opportunity’ for researchers. They were a relatively large group of impoverished and diseased men living in close proximity, who could be manipulated to suit the administrative requirements of the researchers. The Belmont Report argues that such subjects should be protected from this kind of exploitation. As noted previously, for justice in research to hold, however, it may be important to actually include vulnerable individuals and groups such as children and pregnant women, provided appropriate protections are in place, because if they are always excluded, this means that although they are not burdened by research, neither do they benefit.

2 When do People Act Collectively?

Early research on both distributive and procedural justice focused primarily upon the feelings of the individuals who experienced justice or injustice. On this level, there was widespread evidence that justice played a central role in shaping people's feelings and behaviors. Further, people both reacted to their own experiences of justice or injustice and acted to provide justice to other people when they observed injustice. However, most of this research did not acknowledge that justice can also be conceptualized and responded to on the level of groups, not individuals. People can think about injustice in terms of unfairness to groups and they can respond to injustice on a group level. The perception of group level injustice is the key to the development of social movements.

The first crucial insight is that people can think about injustice in terms of unfairness to groups. This insight is contained in the early distinction between egoistical and fraternal deprivation (Runciman 1966). Instead of being concerned with personally receiving fairness, people can judge the fairness received by groups. Psychologists have increasingly recognized that group memberships are an important element in people's self-definitions (Hogg and Abrams 1988) and this has heightened attention to people's reactions to the experiences of the groups to which they belong, as well as to their own personal experiences.

The key issue is how people interpret experiences, that is, their view about the reason for the injustices they experience or observe. If people feel that the injustice is occurring to someone as an individual person, either themselves or someone else, and is due to their personal actions, they will respond personally. If they feel that the injustice is occurring to someone due to their membership in particular groups, or to all the people who share a common group membership, they will respond collectively.

Social identity theory argues that the way people interpret their experience is determined by how they think about people. In particular, people are influenced by the degree to which they construct their sense of self in terms of the groups to which they belong (Hogg and Abrams 1988). To the degree that people think of themselves or others in personal terms, they interpret experiences as reflecting unique personal characteristics and behaviors, and they think about fairness in personal terms. To the degree that they think of people in terms of the group(s) to which they belong (their ‘social’ self), they interpret experiences as reflecting treatment as a member of groups and think about justice in group terms.

Studies confirm that those with strong social-selves are more likely to interpret experiences as being shaped by others attitudes toward the groups to which they and others belong, and to respond to injustice by engaging in collective behavior (Grant and Brown 1995, Kelly and Kelly 1994). So, thinking about injustice in collective terms leads to acting collectively in response to injustice, for example, by joining social movements.

Decisions about whether to respond to injustice individually or collectively are not only shaped by judgments about why injustice is occurring. Choices among possible behavioral responses are also influenced by people's judgments about the intergroup situation (Ellemers 1993). For example, people are influenced by their assessments of the permeability of group boundaries. If people believe that it is possible for individuals to move from low status groups to higher status groups, they are more likely to act as individuals. If people believe that the group's boundaries are not permeable, they are more likely to act collectively to raise the status of their group. Interestingly, studies suggest that very few low status group members need to be successful for people to view the group's boundaries as sufficiently permeable to justify individual, as opposed to collective, action (Wright et al. 1990).

People are also influenced by the perceived stability of group status. When they believe that group status can change, people are more likely to act collectively on behalf of the group. People are similarly affected by their views about the legitimacy of the status of existing groups. If people view current social arrangements as illegitimate, they are more likely to engage in collective action to change them (Major 1994).

Finally, people are influenced by pragmatic concerns. They respond to their sense of the probable gains and losses associated with various types of actions (Klandermans and Oegema 1987). When people decide that injustice has occurred, their general behavioral reaction is to do nothing. This inaction reflects the real risks associated with confronting powerful others, and an objective recognition of the low likelihood of success. On the other hand, risk is not enough of an explanation for people's behavior. For example, although the willingness to engage in collective action is influenced by the likelihood of success (Klandermans 1997), studies of collective action suggest that people often engage in collective actions against injustice even when the likelihood of success is small.

Similar factors shape people's motivation to engage in groups for positive, identity based, reasons. If people feel that their identity is firmly rooted in their group membership (stability), they will act to try to build the stature of their group through collective action. An example is ethnicity, which is often linked to physical appearance. If people feel that their status is not changeable, they are more likely to identify with that group, and to work to improve its status. Of course, such identification can also be strong when physical appearance is not involved. For example, many people identify strongly with being gay, even though they could ‘pass for straight.’ However, when people are members of a low status group they are more strongly tempted to leave the group as an individual and join a higher status group, instead of defining themselves in terms of group membership.

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