Defense Acquisitions: The Global Information Grid and Challenges
Facing Its Implementation (28-JUL-04, GAO-04-858).
The Department of Defense (DOD) is in the midst of transforming
military capabilities. The transformation relies in part on the
Global Information Grid (GIG), which is focused on building a new
Internet-like network capability that DOD envisions will enable
weapons and other systems and people to share information
quickly, allowing warfighters to identify threats more
effectively and to respond with greater precision and lethality.
DOD plans to spend at least $21 billion through 2010 to build a
core GIG capability. GAO was asked (1) to describe the GIG,
including the concept, key acquisitions, and implementation and
(2) to identify significant challenges facing DOD in implementing
the GIG.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-04-858
ACCNO: A11239
TITLE: Defense Acquisitions: The Global Information Grid and
Challenges Facing Its Implementation
DATE: 07/28/2004
SUBJECT: Defense capabilities
Defense procurement
Federal agency reorganization
Information technology
Military operations
Reporting requirements
Reports management
Weapons systems
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GAO-04-858
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO Report to Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and
Capabilities, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives
July 2004
DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS
The Global Information Grid and Challenges Facing Its Implementation
a
GAO-04-858
Highlights of GAO-04-858, a report to Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities, Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives
The Department of Defense (DOD) is in the midst of transforming military
capabilities. The transformation relies in part on the Global Information
Grid (GIG), which is focused on building a new Internet-like network
capability that DOD envisions will enable weapons and other systems and
people to share information quickly, allowing warfighters to identify
threats more effectively and to respond with greater precision and
lethality. DOD plans to spend at least $21 billion through 2010 to build a
core GIG capability. GAO was asked (1) to describe the GIG, including the
concept, key acquisitions, and implementation and (2) to identify
significant challenges facing DOD in implementing the GIG.
GAO is not making recommendations in this report as this effort is focused
on providing an initial overview of the GIG and challenges. Our future
work will continue to assess how DOD is addressing challenges and the
progress of key acquisitions. DODprovided technical comments on this
report are incorporated where appropriate.
July 2004
DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS
The Global Information Grid and Challenges Facing Its Implementation
The GIG is a huge and complex undertaking that is intended to integrate
virtually all of DOD's information systems, services, and applications
into one seamless, reliable, and secure network. DOD's overall concept is
to enable data access for a variety of systems and users in the network no
matter which military service owns a weapon system or where a user might
be located around the world. DOD is looking to the GIG to form the basis
of a network-centric or "netcentric" way of fighting wars and to create a
decisive advantage over adversaries. DOD has taken the following
twopronged approach to building the GIG:
(1) Invest in key acquisitions to build a core networking capability,
including new communication satellites, next-generation interoperable
radios, a new ground-based communication network with significantly
expanded bandwidth, and services and applications to manage and protect
the network and help users locate, post, and share information.
(2) Integrate other existing and planned weapon systems, information
technology systems, and logistics, personnel, and other business-related
systems into the GIG. To integrate other systems, DOD officials who
created the concept for the GIG have developed an initial blueprint or
architecture for the GIG and policies to formalize the GIG, and they are
attempting to influence key acquisition and budgeting decisions to align
investments and systems with the GIG.
The most critical challenge ahead for DOD is making the GIG a reality.
While DOD has taken steps to define its vision and objectives for the GIG
on paper and in policy and is beginning to make a heavy investment in the
GIG as well as systems that will be heavily dependent on the GIG, it is
not fully known how DOD will meet these objectives. For example, it is not
known which investments should take priority over others and how these
decisions will be enforced. Moreover, it is not known how DOD will assess
the overall progress of the GIG and determine whether the network as a
whole is providing a worthwhile return on investment, particularly in
terms of enhancing and even transforming military operations. According to
DOD officials, the enhancements DOD is making to its planning and
budgeting processes are meant to begin addressing these questions. Until
DOD implements an investment and oversight strategy for the GIG as a
whole, it is at risk of making investments that do not fit DOD's vision
for the future.
Highlights of Key Challenges Facing DOD's Implementation of the GIG
o Deciding what capabilities are affordable, what capabilities are
unaffordable or not in line with DOD's vision for the GIG, and enforcing
these decisions
o Assuring management attention and oversight are provided to assess the
overall progress
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-858. and return on investment
o Developing a trustworthy network so data owners will share data with a
broader audience
To view the full product, including the scope o Advancing technologies
on schedule
and methodology, click on the link above. o Developing the means to
protect the network and its data
For more information, contact Robert E. Levin Source: GAO analysis.
at (202) 512-4841 or [email protected]
Contents
Letter
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Results in Brief
Description of the GIG
Acquisitions
Implementation
DOD Challenges in Implementing the GIG
Management and Investment Challenges
Operational Challenges
Technical Challenges
Conclusions
Agency Comments
1
2 3 4 8 14 18 19 24 25 29 30
Appendix I Policies, Standards, and Guidance to Implement the Global
Information Grid
Tables
Table 1: How DOD Envisions GIG Will Help Transform Military
Operations Table 2: DOD Acquisitions Related to the GIG Table 3: Overview
of Six Major Acquisitions Related to the Core
GIG Network and Information Capability Table 4: Key Challenges Table 5:
Selected Global Information Grid Policies, Standards and
Guidance (2000 to 2004) 6 8
10 19
31
Figure
Figure 1: A General Depiction of DOD's Characterization of the GIG 7
Abbreviations
DOD Department of Defense
GIG Global Information Grid
GIG-BE Global Information Grid Bandwidth Expansion
IPv6 Internet Protocol Version 6
JTRS Joint Tactical Radio System
NCES Network Centric Enterprise Services
TSAT Transformational Satellite
WIN-T Warfighter Information Network-Tactical
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United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548
July 28, 2004
The Honorable Jim Saxton
Chairman
The Honorable Martin T. Meehan
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities
Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives
To achieve long-term dominance over evolving, sophisticated threats, the
Department of Defense (DOD) is seeking to make transformational
improvements to military capabilities. The transformation involves
achieving information and decision superiority over adversaries, striking
with precision, deploying and sustaining military power rapidly, and
dominating the "battlespace" on land, at sea, in the air, and in space.
DOD has said that a successful transformation hinges largely on disparate
weapon systems sharing information seamlessly, regardless of which
military service owns the system and preempting the need to retrofit
weapon systems to solve compatibility issues with other systems in the
field. Beyond the need to build new weapon systems according to a
predetermined architecture, DOD says the transformation encompasses new
doctrine and institutional changes for DOD and its partners.
One of DOD's key initiatives to respond to this transformation is the
Global Information Grid (GIG). The GIG represents a collection of programs
and initiatives aimed at building a secure network and set of information
capabilities modeled after the Internet. The GIG is expected to facilitate
DOD's transformation by allowing warfighters, policy makers, and support
personnel to engage in rapid decision making. By having the ability to
access and exchange information quickly, reliably, and securely through
linked systems and military components, DOD believes that commanders would
identify threats more effectively, make informed decisions, and respond
with greater precision and lethality.
DOD began investing in the GIG in the late 1990s and plans to begin
fielding a core capability by about 2010. It plans to spend at least $21
billion to develop the GIG through fiscal year 2010. Full implementation
of the GIG would occur in the 2020 time frame. Given the GIG's overall
investment and importance to DOD, as well as a lack of clarity about what
Objectives, Scope,
and Methodology
the GIG entails, you requested that we review DOD's strategy for
developing and deploying the GIG. As agreed with your office, our work
initially focused on (1) describing the GIG, including the overall
concept, key acquisitions, and implementation strategies and (2)
identifying challenges facing DOD's implementation of the GIG. Subsequent
efforts will further explore the challenges we have identified and the
progress of key acquisitions.
To gain a better understanding of the overall concept, key acquisitions,
and implementation strategy, we reviewed relevant DOD plans, policies,
guidance, and other documents pertaining to the GIG. We also reviewed
briefings prepared for high-ranking DOD officials and other organizations
within the department to obtain more up-to-date information on the status
of GIG activities and costs of key components. Funding and cost
information was obtained from budget exhibits and other accounting reports
compiled by the DOD. We did not conduct a comprehensive review of the
financial reports or records. Also, we did not evaluate the content and
quality of the GIG architecture and standards. In addition, we interviewed
key officials responsible for the GIG in the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Networks Information and Integration (DOD's Chief
Information Officer); the Defense Information Systems Agency; Office of
the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); Office of Program Analysis
and Evaluation; Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics; and Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We held
interviews with officials representing the Offices of the Chief
Information Officer for the Air Force, Army, Navy, and U.S. Marine Corps.
To identify the challenges associated with GIG implementation, we examined
studies, reports, and guides on the GIG; DOD's effort to transition toward
more network-based military operations; and DOD's efforts to enhance its
capability to acquire joint systems that were completed by DOD, the
Defense Science Board, and other research entities, such as the Center for
Strategic and International Studies. We examined reports and guides
completed by the Congressional Research Service, Congressional Budget
Office, and GAO on managing technology projects, architectures, and
information technology investments. We held interviews with previously
identified DOD officials to discuss key challenges associated with the
development and implementation of the GIG.
Results in Brief
We performed our work from November 2003 to June 2004 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
The GIG is a huge and complex undertaking that is intended to integrate
virtually all of DOD's information systems, services, applications, and
data into one seamless, reliable, and secure network. A primary difference
between the GIG initiative and previous efforts is that it focuses on
promoting interoperability by building an Internet-like network for
DODrelated operations based on common standards and protocols rather than
on trying to establish interoperability after individual systems and
platforms have been fielded. DOD envisions that this type of network would
not just ensure systems can easily and quickly exchange data, but also
would change how military operations are planned and executed since much
more information would be dynamically available to users.
DOD's plans for realizing the GIG involve building a new core network and
information capability and successfully integrating the majority of its
weapon systems, command, control, and communications systems, and business
systems with the new network. The effort to build the GIG will require DOD
to make a substantial investment in a new set of core enterprise programs
and initiatives in order to develop and deploy new satellites capable of
quickly transmitting and routing larger volumes of data, increased
bandwidth capacity on the ground, new types of communications systems to
be embedded on weapon systems, and new computer applications and services
to enable information to be transferred globally. To integrate systems
into the GIG, DOD has developed an initial blueprint or architecture for
the GIG, developed new policies, guidance, and standards to guide
implementation, undertaken proactive efforts to "market" the GIG and its
potential benefits among various elements of DOD, and is attempting to
influence key acquisition and budgeting decisions to align with the GIG.
Depending on the extent DOD decides to rely on the GIG to facilitate
military operations, the initiative could affect the way weapon systems
and information technology systems are selected and built as well as how
DOD military and civilian personnel collect, analyze, and share data.
The most critical challenge ahead for DOD is making the GIG a reality.
While DOD has taken steps to define its vision and objectives for the GIG
on paper and in policy and is beginning to make a substantial investment
in the GIG as well as in systems that will be heavily dependent on the
GIG, it is not fully known how DOD will meet these objectives. For
example, it is not known which investments should take priority over
others and how
these decisions will be enforced. Moreover, it is not known how DOD will
assess the overall progress of the GIG and determine whether the network
as a whole is providing a worthwhile return on investment, particularly in
terms of enhancing and even transforming military operations. Until DOD
implements an investment and oversight strategy for the GIG as a whole, it
is at risk of making investments that do not fit its vision for the
future. In addition, DOD faces risks inherent with the nature and scope of
the effort it is undertaking, for example, risks related to protecting
data within the thousands of systems that will be integrated into the
network. Furthermore, the technical challenges to develop new networking
and network management capabilities to support mobile, integrated
communications are considerable. DOD recognizes these challenges, and many
of the actions it is taking to implement the GIG are meant to address
them. However, it is too early to assess how successful DOD will be in
addressing the challenges and overcoming long-standing organizational
impediments.
Description of the GIG
For the past two decades, DOD has been seeking solutions to improve
interoperability and information sharing across its business and
warfighting operations. Too often weapon and information technology
systems have been acquired by the military services and defense agencies
without regard for their ability to work in a joint operational
environment.1 As a result, extra layers of redundancy and common systems
have been put in place to support military operations, but without the
ability to easily and quickly exchange data.
DOD defines the GIG as a "globally interconnected, end-to-end set of
information capabilities, associated processes, and personnel for
collecting, processing, storing, disseminating, and managing information."
The GIG is meant to improve interoperability among DOD's many information
systems and weapon systems. More important, the GIG is to facilitate DOD's
effort to transform to a more network-based, or "netcentric," way of
fighting wars and achieving information superiority over adversaries, much
the same way as the Internet has transformed industry and society on a
global scale. Netcentric operations and warfare, according to DOD, are the
combination of tactics, techniques, and procedures that a networked force
can employ to create a decisive
1 U.S. General Accounting Office, Joint Warfighting: Attacking
Time-Critical Targets, GAO-02-204R (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 30, 2001).
warfighting advantage. The GIG's role is to create an environment in which
users can access data on demand at any location without having to rely on
(and wait for) organizations in charge of data collection to process and
disseminate the information. Data could emanate from a variety of sources,
including weapon systems belonging to other military services, space-based
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance satellites, and DOD
logistics, financial, and other systems that carry out business
operations. Ultimately, DOD expects that most of these systems will become
part of the GIG.2
With greater data access and a more robust communications infrastructure,
DOD expects the GIG to enable more timely execution of military
operations, collaborative mission planning and execution, common views of
the battlespace, and more timely assessments of the condition of equipment
and the levels of supplies. For example, according to DOD officials,
greater information sharing could dramatically increase capabilities to
rapidly identify and strike time-critical targets, such as mobile
surface-to-air missile sites. In the past, such targets have proved to be
elusive because the enemy is able to move them to safety in a shorter time
frame than it takes U.S. military forces to detect, assess, and attack the
targets. By having greater command of a battle situation, DOD expects that
lethality and survivability of equipment and personnel would be increased.
Armor protection could be scaled down in favor of more agility. In
addition, the GIG would reduce the substantial resources and logistics
needed to bring command, control, and communications systems to the
war-fighting environment. Table 1 illustrates how DOD envisions the GIG
will help transform military operations.
2 DOD defines the GIG to include "all owned and leased communications and
computing systems and services, software (including applications), data,
security services, and other associated services necessary to achieve
information superiority."
Table 1: How DOD Envisions GIG Will Help Transform Military Operations
Current Future
Customized, platform-centric information technology
Circuit-based transmission of data
Bandwidth limitations
Limited operational picture
Fixed and remote command and control
Broadcast (push) information to users
Collect, process, exploit, disseminate
Individual
Stovepipe decision making
Multiple data calls, data duplication
Private data
Perimeter, one-time security
Single points of failure
Separate infrastructures
Interoperability by standard applications
Network-centric, commercial off-the-shelf software, Web-based
Internet protocol-based transmission of data
Bandwidth on demand
Situational awareness
Mobile, deployable, in-transit command and control
Post information on network and facilitate "smart" pull by users
Collect, post, process, use
Collaborative
Communities of interest
Handle information only once
Shared data
Persistent, continuous information assurance
Diverse routing
Enterprise services
Interoperability designed from start ("born joint")
Sources: DOD (data); GAO (presentation).
The GIG is to be much like the Internet, but with less dependence on
ground-based and fixed systems and equipment to transmit and route data
and more dependence on space-based and mobile, ad hoc systems to carry out
these functions. Figure 1 shows the various layers of the GIG's overall
concept. At the core are communications satellites, next-generation
radios, and an installations-based network with significantly expanded
bandwidth. These will provide the basic infrastructure through which data
will be routed and shared. In addition, the GIG would employ a variety of
information technology services and applications to manage the flow of
information and ensure the network is reliable and secure. Various
information technology tools would be available to help users determine
what information is available, where to find it, and how best to use it.
DOD envisions that communities of interest would be developed, linking
users with common interests who would collaborate on analyzing and sharing
information. Ultimately, most of DOD's sensors, weapon systems, business
systems, and systems belonging to decision makers, military units, and
allies would be tied into the GIG network-serving as both users and
providers of data.
Figure 1: A General Depiction of DOD's Characterization of the GIG
Sources: DOD (data); GAO (analysis).
Acquisitions
DOD has taken a two-pronged approach to build the GIG: (1) invest in a set
of core enterprise programs and initiatives to build a core network and
information capability and (2) bring other existing and planned weapon
systems, command, control, and communications systems, information
technology systems, and logistics, personnel, and other business-related
systems into the GIG network. The core network acquisitions are to be
developed incrementally over time, with the aim of fielding the first
increment of the GIG by 2010. The GIG is primarily being developed under
the leadership and direction of DOD's Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Networks and Information Integration in coordination with
other components in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint
Staff. The Defense Information Systems Agency, military services,
combatant commands, and other defense agencies also play roles in
implementing the GIG. In addition, DOD's Strategic Command has
responsibilities for eventually operating the GIG. Table 2 shows the key
acquisitions for the GIG's core network and examples of additional
acquisitions that must be integrated with the GIG.
Table 2: DOD Acquisitions Related to the GIG
Key acquisitions to build GIG's core Examples of acquisitions that must be
network and information capability integrated with the GIG
Communications satellites Weapon systems
Interoperable radio systems Sensors
Expanded bandwidth on the ground Command, control, and communications
Information technology applications to systems
support the network Logistics, personnel, and other businessrelated
systems
Core GIG Network Acquisitions
Sources: DOD (data); GAO (analysis).
According to DOD, the key acquisitions underway to build the GIG network
capability include 1) Transformational Satellite3 (TSAT), a new
constellation of communications satellites to transmit and route larger
volumes of data; 2) Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS), a new family of
interoperable radio systems; 3) Global Information Grid-Bandwidth
Expansion (GIG-BE), which includes state of the art optical network
technologies and upgraded routers and switches to increase bandwidth for
greater voice, data, and video transmissions as well as improvements in
3 TSAT is one of six initiatives under development as part of the
Transformational Communications System Initiative.
network services at about 90 DOD installations; 4) Network Centric
Enterprise Services (NCES), a common set of services and applications to
manage the network and help users locate and share information; 5)
Cryptography Transformation Initiative,4 tools to protect sensitive
information transmitted across the network and protect the network from
attack; and 6) Horizontal Fusion, which is a portfolio of initiatives
focused on developing and demonstrating data applications and tools for
information sharing and netcentric operations.
Table 3 reviews each of the key acquisitions for the GIG's core
capability, including the purpose, the financial investment between fiscal
years 2004 and 2009, the military service or defense agency responsible
for managing the acquisition, and the current status. Some of these
acquisitions will require funding, including sustainment costs, beyond
2009 but amounts are not yet known.
4 The Cryptography Transformation Initiative is part of DOD's broader
Information Assurance program, which includes many security initiatives
critical to the GIG. The cryptography initiative is funded from different
program elements within DOD's Information Assurance program.
Table 3: Overview of Six Major Acquisitions Related to the Core GIG
Network and Information Capability
Investment
(fiscal years 2004 Program or initiative Purpose to 2009) Manager Status
TSAT To develop satellites to serve as the cornerstone of a new DOD
communications infrastructure and provide high bandwidth connectivity to
the warfighter. Some of the technologies that TSAT plans to use are laser
cross-links, space-based data processing and Internet routing systems, and
highly agile multibeam/phased array antennas.
$8.5 billion Air Force. Product development began in early fiscal year
2004; first satellite scheduled to launch in 2011.
JTRS To develop family of $5.8 Joint service Army is leading
software- billion program the
defined radios to responsible for the development of a
interoperate cluster
with different types of software of radios for
existing communications ground
radios and architecture and vehicles and
significantly helicopters.
increase voice, data, waveforms; military This cluster
and began in
video communications service-led 2002; the first
programs radios are
capabilities. responsible for to be fielded in
developing fiscal year
radios. 2007.
GIG-BE To provide additional bandwidth and information access at key
military installations within the United States and overseas via a
combination of acquiring bandwidth from commercial providers as well as
extending fiber optic networks to bases and installations that are located
away from commercial networks.
$373 million Defense Information Procurement phase Systems Agency. began
in 2003. Initially, 10 sites to be completed this year and the remaining
sites in 2005.
Investment
(fiscal years 2004 Program or initiative Purpose to 2009) Manager Status
NCES To enable network users to identify, access, send, store, and
protect information. Also to enable DOD to monitor and manage network
performance and problems. Is expected to require development of new
capabilities and tools for tagging data so it is useful, providing users
with capability to identify relevant information based on content and
allowing users to freely exchange and collaborate on information.
$371 million Defense Information In concept phase; Systems Agency. product
development to begin in fiscal year 2004; initial set of core services to
be provided beginning in fiscal year 2005.
Crypto Transformation To enable DOD to protect the $4.8 billion
Initiative network and sensitive information. To provide information
assurance and encryption support, including cryptography equipment (e.g.,
Internet protocol encryptors), firewalls, intrusion detection systems,
etc.
Horizontal Fusion A portfolio of initiatives, drawn $1.3 billion from
existing programs, intended to demonstrate netcentric capabilities and
address operational and technical challenges. Initiative underway, for
example, to Web-enable current data sources, tools, and applications.
National Security Agency, Defense Information Systems Agency, and the
military services.
Office of the Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information
Integration.
The National Security Agency is developing information assurance component
of GIG architecture; other ongoing efforts to develop enhanced encryption
capabilities.
Ongoing program. Initial set of initiatives funded in fiscal year 2003.
Annual demonstrations known as "Quantum Leap" conducted on initiatives.
Sources: DOD (data); GAO (analysis).
In developing the GIG's core capability, DOD intends to build upon and
enhance ongoing terrestrial and space-based networks and systems, such as
the Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellite communication system and
the Defense Information Systems Network. The new programs underway are
intended to improve communications and networking capabilities
significantly. For example, according to DOD officials, current
telecommunication lines are not robust enough to handle the volume of
information needed to facilitate optimal, strategic decision making. The
GIG-BE is designed to remove current bandwidth constraints. The GIG-BE is
to use advanced fiber-optic backbone and switching technology to upgrade
telecommunications lines and provide initially up to 10 gigabytes
Other Acquisitions That Must Be Integrated with the GIG Core Network
per second of bandwidth at selected defense installations around the
world. Also, unlike DOD's legacy radio systems that cannot interoperate
with one another, JTRS is software-based, meaning that the radios are
essentially computers that can be programmed to imitate other types of
radios and thus be readily configured to operate in different networks and
waveforms5 based on common standards. JTRS is expected to act as a gateway
for users with different hardware radios-a capability that speeds the
transition to universal interoperability for DOD military operations.
Also, unlike current communication satellites, TSAT is to be equipped with
laser-optical payloads for high-capacity links to other air and space
platforms. By using laser-optics, TSAT is intended to operate above the
radiofrequency spectrum and provide relief to current military bandwidth
constraints. NCES is to make use of commercial products and tools to
manage messaging, storage, search, and other capabilities across
platforms, but also require new and possibly customized services to ensure
the sharing of information based on mission demands and priorities. Tools
to allow users to "smartly" pull and fuse information will require
investing in new data content and management techniques. Enhanced security
(information assurance)6 capabilities will need to be developed, including
encryption mechanisms and devices, intrusion detection systems, and secure
network management.
Most ongoing and planned weapon systems; command, control and
communications systems; and business systems will need to be integrated
with the GIG network, because they will be the primary providers and
receivers of data needed to support future military operations.
o DOD plans to integrate most weapon systems into the GIG. In fact, some
"transformational" weapon systems now under development require a more
advanced communications infrastructure to perform as
5 A waveform is the representation of a signal that includes the
frequency, modulation type, message format, and/or transmission system. In
general usage, the term waveform refers to a known set of characteristics,
for example, frequency bands (VHF, HF, UHF), modulation techniques (FM,
AM), message standards, and transmission systems. In JTRS, the term
waveform is used to describe the entire set of radio functions that occur
from the user input to the radiofrequency output and vice versa.
6 "Information assurance is defined by DOD as measures that protect and
defend information and information systems by ensuring their availability,
integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation. This
includes providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating
protection, detection, and reaction capabilities. "Department of Defense
Directive 8500.1, Information Assurance, October 24, 2002 (Certified
current as of Nov. 21, 2003), Section E2.1.17.
intended and to support voice, data, videoconferencing, and imagery
transmissions. Without an integrated network that ties together
different systems and enables information to flow freely across the
battlefield, the high-paced warfare that DOD envisioned is likely to be
constrained, according to DOD. For example, the Army is developing
the Future Combat Systems, a new generation of manned and
unmanned ground vehicles, air vehicles, and munitions that are to be
lighter and more mobile yet lethal and survivable. Rather than rely on
heavy armor to withstand an enemy attack, the Future Combat Systems
will depend on superior information to see and kill the enemy before
being detected. According to DOD, the ability to make this leap
depends on (1) a network to collect, process, and deliver vast amounts
of information, such as imagery and data, and (2) the performance of
the individual systems themselves. Not only must systems within the
Future Combat Systems interoperate effectively, they also must
interoperate with the GIG. The GIG must perform at a level that
enables the Future Combat Systems to quickly collect, process, and
deliver data. DOD is also developing a new constellation of satellites-
known as Space-Based Radar-to provide a near continuous, all
weather global capability of collecting intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance7 information. Space-Based Radar is expected to be a
critical data provider to transformational systems, such as those within
the Future Combat Systems. Like the Future Combat Systems, the
satellites will require a more robust communications infrastructure to
send massive amounts of imagery data in a timely fashion. According to
DOD, if TSAT, a key GIG component, is not ready in time or cannot
provide the capability originally planned, DOD may need to build
additional capability into Space-Based Radar satellites and ground
stations to reduce the dependency on the communications
infrastructure to transmit data.8
o DOD intends to integrate virtually all command, control, and
communications, systems into the GIG. At the same time, DOD intends to
develop and modify these systems to provide military commanders
7 Intelligence is defined by DOD as the product resulting from the
collection, processing, integration, analysis, and evaluation of
information. Surveillance is the systematic observation of places,
persons, or things through visual and other means. Reconnaissance is a
mission undertaken to obtain information about activities and resources of
an enemy or potential enemy or to secure data characteristics of a
particular area.
8 U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Acquisitions: Space-Based Radar
Effort Needs Additional Knowledge Before Starting Development, GAO-04-759
(Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2004).
and forces with near-real time descriptions of the location and
disposition of U.S. military forces and adversaries operating on the
ground and in the air and to provide the ability to communicate across all
elements involved in military operations. Each of the military services
has major architectural initiatives underway (the Air Force's C2
Constellation and ConstellationNet, the Army's LandWarNet, and the Navy's
ForceNet) to transform their command, control, and communications systems
and information infrastructures into the GIG. For example, the Army's
Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) program (part of
LandWarNet) is intended to be the integrating communications network that
links Future Combat Systems units with higher Army echelons and with the
GIG. In addition, DOD considers numerous other systems to be important in
achieving the GIG, including the Mobile User Objective System (satellite
communications), Global Command and Control System/Joint Command and
Control, Deployed Joint Command and Control, and Teleports (information
transport system). DOD has further identified the need to eventually link
the GIG to coalition, allied, and non-DOD users and systems.
o DOD also intends to integrate its business systems into the GIG. These
include acquisition and procurement systems, financial management systems,
personnel and health systems, logistics systems, and strategic planning
and budgeting systems. Many of these play an important role in supporting
military operations. For example, logistics systems are used to plan,
control, and carry out the efficient and effective movement and
maintenance of forces.
The GIG's success is dependent on DOD's ability to successfully integrate
the majority of its weapon systems, command, control, and communications
systems, and business systems with the new core network. To make this
happen, DOD has developed a blueprint or architecture for the GIG;
developed new policies, guidance, and standards to guide implementation
decisions; undertaken proactive efforts to "market" the GIG and its
potential benefits; and is attempting to influence key budgeting and
acquisition decision-making processes to align with the GIG concept.
To help guide decision-making, DOD has developed an initial architecture
for the GIG, which, according to DOD, presents the current information
technology environment and desired (target) technology environment;
describes how the commands, services, and defense agencies will operate in
a netcentric environment, based on selected strategic, operational, and
Implementation
Architecture and Policies
tactical scenarios; and identifies the actions and information
requirements for conducting operations in a netcentric environment, how
systems will need to function to access information, and emerging
standards for the development and acquisition of systems. DOD also has
developed a reference model so program managers of various architectures
and systems can ensure GIG compliance.9 According to DOD, the reference
model's key purpose is to provide users with an understanding of the GIG
through common definitions and terms of reference, standards, and
templates for developing more detailed architectures. Future versions of
the GIG architecture are to include more complete views of DOD's
operational environment and existing enterprise requirements. Furthermore,
DOD is modifying its Joint Technical Architecture,10 which sets standard
technologies and protocols to better ensure interoperability and to
complement the GIG architecture.
DOD is also in the process of issuing new policies, standards, and
guidance to formalize the architecture. Specifically, DOD has created
policy that requires all departmental architectures to be GIG compliant.
DOD also has developed specific policies, standards, and guidance to
implement the GIG and help ensure that the military services acquire
systems that integrate with the GIG. Several policies establish the GIG as
a cornerstone for enabling DOD to achieve information superiority,
formally define the objectives and key elements of the GIG, and assign
roles and responsibilities for the GIG on an enterprise basis. Others
assign responsibility and define waiver procedures for specific aspects of
the GIG, such as ground-based telecommunications networks and NCES. For
example, DOD formalized a waiver process to assess network and
telecommunications systems (such as local area networks) that are not
GIG-compliant. In addition, DOD has set standards to address data
connectivity. To provide a common format for the transmission of
information across the GIG, DOD recently mandated that GIG systems
9 Referred to as the Netcentric Operations Warfare Reference Model,
Version 1.0, December 2003.
10 For several years, DOD has emphasized the use of a framework that
defines three types of architectures: operational, technical, and system.
A technical architecture is a set of rules to guide the design of systems
and consists primarily of a common set of standards and protocols for
sending and receiving information (e.g., Internet protocol), understanding
information (e.g., format standards), and processing the information. The
Joint Technical Architecture specifies the minimum set of standards and
guidance for the acquisition of all DOD systems that produce, use, or
exchange information.
Influencing Acquisition and Budgeting Decisions
must be Internet Protocol Version 611 capable, as well as Internet
Protocol Version 4 (the Internet currently is based on version 4.),12 or
obtain a waiver. Furthermore, DOD developed a netcentric data strategy,
standardizing the way data will be described and used in systems that make
up the GIG. Appendix I provides more details on these policies, standards,
and guidance.
DOD officials who developed the GIG concept also expect to influence
decisions by participating in DOD's key decision-making processes. Over
the past couple years, DOD has revised its three primary decision-making
processes for determining and delivering military capabilities-
requirements setting, acquisition, and budgeting-to focus acquisitions and
investment decisions on meeting joint mission needs, particularly with
regard to interoperability. In revising these processes, DOD has
emphasized compliance with the GIG architecture. DOD officials have taken
further action intended to strengthen these decisions by developing tools
and criteria for actively participating in the decision-making process-by
assisting military services in preparing for major acquisition reviews (as
part of integrated product teams) and/or by providing input to
decision-making boards. The revisions DOD has made to its requirements
setting, acquisition, and budgeting process are all fairly recent.
Therefore, it is too early to assess whether they will be successful in
achieving their goals.
For example, DOD revised its requirements-setting process to shift the
focus to a more capabilities-based approach for determining joint
warfighting needs rather than a threat-based approach focused on
individual systems and platforms. Under the threat-based approach, the
services were primarily responsible for defining requirements, selecting
alternatives, and developing systems, which frequently resulted in the
fielding of stovepiped systems and duplicating capabilities. DOD's
rationale for shifting to capabilities-based requirements is a recognition
11 Internet protocol specifies the format of packets, also called
"datagrams," and the addressing scheme for communication transmissions and
virtual connections made over the Internet. Internet Protocol Version 6
(also referred to as IPv6) is the latest version of this protocol.
12 IPv6 includes a transition mechanism that is designed to allow users to
adopt and deploy IPv6 in a highly diffuse fashion and to provide direct
interoperability between IPv4 and IPv6 hosts. The transition to a new
version of the Internet Protocol is intended to be incremental and allow
users to upgrade their hosts to IPv6, and network operators to deploy IPv6
in routers, with very little coordination between the two.
that there is greater uncertainty in future military conflicts without a
clearly defined adversary and it will need to respond across a broader
range of military operations. The new Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development System, established in October 2003, is organized around key
functional concepts and areas-command and control, force application,
battlespace awareness, focused logistics, and force protection--aimed at
improving joint warfighting capabilities. In addition, a sixth area has
been established-netcentric operations-to enable planning across
functional areas and support integration of netcentric capabilities. The
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information
Integration and Joint Staff officials believe the joint concept will
provide a more coherent framework for identifying capabilities gaps,
comparing alternatives, aligning requirements to the GIG, and reduce the
potential for stovepiped, duplicative capabilities.
DOD officials also indicated that the department has begun revising its
planning and budgeting process in an effort to instill more collaboration
among different components of the department in investment decisions. For
example, DOD is asking the military services to plan budgets around
guidance that takes a joint perspective. Data collection and management
processes are intended to be merged into a portfolio management approach
that enables program reviews and budget reviews to occur in a more
integrated manner rather than sequentially. To complement this process,
DOD is planning to develop an investment portfolio management structure to
better manage its information technology resources where decisions about
what information technology investments to make, modify, or terminate, are
based on the GIG architecture and other objectives, such as mission area
goals. Other recent policies have focused on establishing more effective
investment processes for information technology systems that need to
integrate with the GIG.
DOD has developed several mechanisms to complement the decision making
that occurs within the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
System, planning and budgeting, and acquisition processes. For example, in
November 2003, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Networks and Information Integration, in consultation with the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition
Technology and Logistics, and U.S. Joint Forces Command,
established a new Net-Ready Key Performance Parameter13 and review process
to focus greater attention on systems interoperability for joint
operations as well as the information-sharing requirements of the GIG. The
Net-Ready Key Performance Parameter is built around compliance with the
GIG architecture, and the reference model will be used to assess system
information needs, information assurance, and the technical exchange of
information. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks
and Information Integration has also developed a netcentric checklist to
guide the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System and
acquisition reviews. The checklist is based on the GIG architecture and
will be used to assess whether key standards and protocols are being
considered and built into particular capabilities and systems being
acquired. In addition, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Network and Information Integration has established a systems
engineering and evaluation capability to support the reviews. A team of
systems engineers will provide end-to-end technical support to the office
and funding has been requested to create a facility to test key GIGrelated
systems and components. DOD will be conducting specific netcentric reviews
of major acquisition programs to assess whether they are transitioning to
integrate with the future network. About 129 information technology,
weapon systems, and business systems have been selected to participate in
the initial round of assessments. These reviews are scheduled to be
completed later this year.
The most critical challenge ahead for DOD is making the GIG a reality.
While DOD has taken steps to define its vision and objectives for the GIG
on paper and in policy, it is not fully known how DOD will meet these
objectives, particularly with respect to setting investment priorities,
providing management attention and oversight, transforming operations, and
advancing technologies. At the same time, DOD is beginning to make a heavy
investment in the GIG as well as systems that will be heavily dependent on
the GIG, such as the Army's Future Combat Systems, and DOD is asking its
components and the military services to accept its vision and plan toward
it. In addition, DOD faces risks inherent with the nature and scope of the
effort it is undertaking, for example, risks related to protecting data
within the thousands of systems that will be integrated
DOD Challenges in Implementing the GIG
13 A key performance parameter represent those critical performance
parameters so significant that a failure to meet a minimum value of
performance can call into question a system's ability to perform missions.
into the network. DOD recognizes these challenges, and many of the actions
it is taking to implement the GIG are meant to address them. However, it
is too early to assess how successful DOD will be in addressing the
challenges and overcoming long-standing organizational impediments.
Table 4 below highlights some of the key challenges facing DOD.
Table 4: Key Challenges
Management and investment
o Deciding what capabilities are affordable; what capabilities are
unaffordable or not in line with DOD's vision for the GIG, and enforcing
these decisions among thousands of systems and across the military
services. Assuring DOD has the right representation in acquisition
decisions.
o Assuring management attention and oversight is provided to assess the
overall progress of the GIG and determine whether it is providing a
worthwhile return on investment, particularly in terms of enhancing and
even transforming military operations.
Operational o Deciding when, how, and how much information should be
posted on the network and used.
o Establishing rules to ensure the GIG can work as intended without
reducing benefits of flexible and dynamic information sharing.
o Convincing data owners of the value of sharing data with a broader
audience and trusting the network enough to post data.
Technical o Developing new technologies and advancing them on schedule.
o Assuring common agreement on technical as well as information
assurance standards and requirements.
o Developing the means to protect the network and its data.
Management and Investment Challenges
Source: GAO analysis.
While DOD has taken steps to establish a vision and objectives for the
GIG, it is still not fully known how DOD will manage, oversee, and invest
in this effort. Addressing these questions is a daunting task. DOD must
find ways to make and enforce trade-off decisions for literally thousands
of information technology systems, weapon systems, command and control
systems, intelligence systems, and other systems.14 These decisions will
need to span a wide range of organizations, including the military
services and their respective major commands and functional activities,
numerous large defense agencies and field activities, and various
combatant and joint operational commands that are responsible for military
operations for specific geographic regions or theaters of operations.
Having accurate and reliable visibility over spending on systems that must
integrate with the GIG will be necessary as well as having effective
mechanisms for identifying and deciding which systems should be pursued
and which should not. In 2003, we reported (as part of a survey of federal
agencies enterprise architecture programs) that DOD had made progress in
developing the GIG architecture, however, the department had not completed
some essential architecture products that describe the desired (target)
technology environment and provide a sequencing plan for transitioning to
it.15 More specifically, at this point, DOD is largely leaving it up to
its components and services to decide how best to migrate their systems to
the GIG. There is no well-defined strategy that
o identifies what capabilities DOD will invest in and what it will not
invest in;
o identifies how investments will align with the goals and objectives of
the GIG architecture;
o determines what is affordable, particularly in light of near-term and
long-term needs;
o sets out criteria for determining what legacy systems should remain or
be phased out; and
o specifies by whom and how decisions will be enforced.
In addition, it is unknown how senior leaders within DOD will be able to
focus on the progress of the GIG as a whole, that is, whether it is being
developed and fielded within cost and schedule, whether risks are being
adequately mitigated, and whether the GIG is providing a worthwhile return
on investment, particularly in terms of enhancing military operations.
Until DOD implements an investment and oversight strategy
14 DOD's information technology budget (covering national security and
business systems) for fiscal year 2004 totaled about $28 billion. Of this,
about $10.5 billion was for modernizing systems and the remaining $17.5
billion for operating and maintaining existing systems.
15 U. S. General Accounting Office, Information Technology: Leadership
Remains Key to Agencies Making Progress on Enterprise Architecture
Efforts, GAO-04-40 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 17, 2003).
for the GIG as a whole, it is at risk of making investments that do not
fit its vision for the future.
According to DOD officials, the enhancements DOD is making to its planning
and budgeting processes are meant to begin addressing these questions.
However, these changes may be difficult to implement for a number of
reasons. First, to some degree because of the broad scope and crosscutting
nature of the GIG concept, no office or single program is in charge of the
GIG, making it more difficult to make and enforce trade-off decisions.
Moreover, while key acquisition, budgeting, and requirements setting
processes have been modified, they still largely operate under the same
organizational structure, where it has been difficult to link acquisition
and investment decisions to joint concepts like the GIG.
Additionally, previous efforts that have been undertaken in past years to
foster interoperability among DOD systems have had limited success,
principally because management tools and leadership attention were not
strong enough to provide sufficient oversight and overcome resistance by
the military services to forgo their unique requirements in favor of
requirements that would benefit the department, as the following examples
illustrate:
o In our 2001 report16 on DOD's efforts to improve its ability to attack
time-critical targets, we noted that DOD had undertaken numerous
efforts to achieve system interoperability, including the development of
guidance, oversight controls, directives and policies, and technology
demonstrations. However, success was limited because DOD had not yet
overcome resistance from the military services, it lacked an
architecture to guide interoperability efforts and some current oversight
and control mechanisms, such as the interoperability certification
process, were not working or were not being enforced.
o In 2003, we reported17 that two joint acquisition programs lacked
mechanisms to overcome parochialism and stovepipes at the military service
level. The JTRS program lacked a strong management structure
16 U.S. General Accounting Office, Joint Warfighting: Attacking
Time-Critical Targets, GAO-02-204R (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 30, 2001).
17U.S. General Accounting Office, Challenges and Risks Associated with the
Joint Tactical Radio System Program, GAO-03-879R (Washington, D.C.: Aug.
11, 2003) and Force Structure: Improved Strategic Planning Can Enhance
DOD's Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Efforts, GAO-04-342 (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
17, 2004).
to resolve operational requirements and funding issues among the services
and DOD's approach to planning Unmanned Aerial Vehicles lacked an
effective strategic plan to ensure the military services and other defense
agencies focus their development efforts on systems that complement each
other.
o In 2004, we reported18 that DOD was making limited progress with its
business modernization initiative-a departmentwide effort focused on
transforming DOD business operations, including standardizing and
optimizing business systems across DOD and reducing duplication. After 3
years of effort, we reported that we have not seen any
significant change in the content of DOD's business systems
modernization architecture (which is to be integrated into the GIG
architecture) or in DOD's approach to investing billions of dollars in
existing and new business systems. Further, DOD had not yet
implemented an effective management structure and processes to
provide adequate control and accountability over its $5 billion annual
investment in business systems modernization. In particular, we
reported that DOD had not yet clearly defined the roles and
responsibilities for its new business investment domains, established
common investment criteria, and conducted a comprehensive review
of its existing business systems to ensure that they are consistent with
the business modernization architecture. DOD acknowledged that it
still had much more to do, including developing the business systems
modernization architecture to a necessary level of detail, defining
specific performance metrics, and clarifying the roles and
responsibilities associated with managing the domains of portfolios of
business systems and ensuring that these systems comply with the
architecture.
Several recent studies sponsored by DOD recognize that developing an
investment strategy and adopting better management tools is critical for
the success of the GIG. For example, a 1999 Defense Science Board study19
assessed DOD's strategies and processes for attaining information
18 U.S. General Accounting Office, DOD Business Systems Modernization:
Limited Progress in Development of Business Enterprise Architecture and
Oversight of Information Technology Investments, GAO-04-731R (Washington,
D.C.: May 17, 2004) and Department of Defense: Further Actions Needed to
Establish and Implement a Framework for Successful Financial and Business
Management Transformation, GAO04-551T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 23, 2004).
19 Defense Science Board Task Force, Tactical Battlefield Communications
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 1999).
superiority and advocated that (1) an executive office be established to
lead and implement the GIG and that (2) the office develop an
implementation plan, including technical milestones and measurable interim
goals, and identify resources to permit the transition to and completion
of the GIG. A 2004 report by the U.S. Joint Forces Command,20 documenting
the processes and planned activities underway to achieve transformational
improvements in joint military capabilities, recommended, among other
things, that the GIG should include a timephased plan for how future
capabilities will link to current investments. In addition, the report
recommends that such a plan should show how network development efforts
underway by each of the military services will contribute to and be
compatible with the GIG.
Other studies have pointed to the need to strengthen current management
processes to ensure warfighters themselves have more input into investment
decisions. For example, a 2003 study21 chartered by the Secretary of
Defense to examine how DOD develops, resources and provides joint
capabilities, recommended moderate to more radical actions to streamline
existing processes and/or establish alternative organizations to better
integrate defense capabilities in support of joint military objectives.
Organizational alternatives for strengthening the acquisition process
ranged from the establishment of joint program executives for each of the
Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System's functional
capabilities areas that would provide input and oversee resources on joint
programs, to capability acquisition executives for each of the capability
areas who would have direct oversight and decision authority over all
programs. A 2004 study by the Center for Strategic and International
Studies22 identified defense reforms needed to meet the challenges of a
new strategic era and made a number of recommendations, including several
to improve the acquisition of joint capabilities and establish a more
effective resource allocation process. For example, the study recommended
that the Joint Staff (J-6-Command, Control, Communications, and Computers)
be expanded into a
20 U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Transformation Roadmap (Washington,
D.C.: Jan. 21, 2004).
21 Joint Defense Capabilities Study Team, Joint Defense Capabilities
Study: Final Report (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 2003).
22 C.A. Murdock et al, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New
Strategic Era, Phase 1 Report (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and
International Studies, Mar. 2004).
departmentwide, joint task force with budgetary and acquisition authority
for joint command and control capabilities. In addition, to improve
tradeoff decisions across mission areas, the study advocates building
capacities in the combatant commands for a stronger role in the resource
allocation process.
Operational
Challenges
There are also many unknowns concerning how DOD will meet its requirements
and vision in terms of people, processes, and, ultimately, operations.
First, DOD has yet to determine how much information should be posted on
the network; when it should be posted; and how and where it should be
used. Once these factors are determined, DOD must develop rules of
operation to ensure the network can work as intended without precluding
the benefits that can be derived from more flexible and dynamic
information sharing. Currently, various offices within DOD are working
through questions on whether unlimited amounts of data should be made
available through the GIG, including unprocessed intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance data, without the benefit of some
assimilation and analysis. These are important questions that need to be
addressed in the near future because they could affect the direction of
investments in netcentric systems and non-network systems as well as
changes that need to be made in how the intelligence community operates.
Even after these questions are settled, significant operational challenges
remain. Joint commanders and the military services may need to find ways
to adapt to an environment where data can be more readily obtained and
shared by lower levels in the chains of command. New operational concepts
are being developed to guide how military operations are to be conducted
in this enhanced technology environment. They will need to be followed by
associated doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Developing joint
operational concepts is one of the key tenets under the Joint Capabilities
Integration and Development System; however, it is unclear how the
concepts will be developed and translated by these boards into more
detailed tactics, techniques and procedures. We recently reported that DOD
had been proceeding with the JTRS program for several years without clear
definition of how JTRS capabilities should be used in an operational
environment and that the program's concept of operations did not reflect
the joint vision of JTRS but instead the servicecentric radio-replacement
perspective. If DOD is to achieve its long-term goals for netcentric
warfare, it is imperative that it develop concepts and processes for how
individual systems, such as JTRS, can be used to leverage DOD's new
network infrastructure and maximize interoperability and collaboration in
military operations.
Moreover, DOD must successfully persuade data owners to accept the value
of sharing data with a broader audience and to trust the network enough to
post data. We spoke with several officials in charge of GIG programs who
acknowledged that facilitating these cultural changes- particularly with
the intelligence community-will be difficult.
In addition, DOD also faces a formidable task in persuading the military
services and other users of the network to rely on information technology
applications and services being developed by the Defense Information
Systems Agency. This agency has been tasked with developing and providing
key voice, video, and data connectivity through core enterprise services
for the GIG, such as data query (search or discovery) capabilities and
information assurance. However, the military services and defense agencies
have historically been reluctant to rely on the Defense Information
Systems Agency for these services. We have reported in the past that the
military services have regularly bypassed Defense Information Systems
Agency, preferring instead to procure their own telecommunications
networks and commercial satellites bandwidth services because they were
dissatisfied with the level of service provided by the agency as well as
the cost and length of time it took to procure these services centrally.23
Building a reliable, secure network that will operate on the move,
virtually anywhere and provide the necessary information and services to
enable netcentric military operations presents considerable technical
challenges. While DOD intends to utilize existing commercial
communications and networking technologies, which have advanced
significantly in recent years, the GIG requires DOD to advance a number of
key technologies, develop a series of complex systems and software, field
them without delay so schedules for other dependent systems are not
disrupted, and develop the means to effectively manage and protect the
network and its data.
Technical Challenges
23 U.S. General Accounting Office, Satellite Communications: Strategic
Approach for DOD's Procurement of Commercial Satellite Bandwidth,
GAO-04-206 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 10, 2003); Defense Networks: Management
Information Shortfalls Hinder Defense Efforts to Meet DISN Goals,
GAO/AIMD-98-202 (Washington, D.C.: July 30, 1998); and Defense IRM:
Investments at Risk for DOD Computer Centers, GAO/AIMD-97-39 (Washington,
D.C.: Apr. 4, 1997).
At this time, however, DOD is pushing ahead on several programs with
immature technologies and with aggressive development and fielding
schedules. As a result, DOD is at risk of not delivering required
capabilities within budgeted resources. This, in turn, may affect
schedules and funding for other systems depending on the GIG. For example,
two key GIGrelated programs-JTRS and TSAT-are facing schedule and
performance risks, which are largely rooted in attempts to move these
programs into product development without sufficient knowledge that their
technologies can work as intended. In March 2004, we reported that none of
the 20 critical hardware and software technologies for the Army's initial
JTRS radio development for ground vehicles and helicopters were
sufficiently mature according to best practice standards.24 When product
development began in June 2002, the Army determined that while many of the
technologies within the program had been used in other radio applications,
they could not be assessed as mature because they had not been integrated
into a complex radio, such as JTRS. Mature backup technologies exist for
some critical technologies, but program officials have cautioned that
substituting them could complicate integration or result in degraded
performance. Moreover, the program recently experienced a 4-month schedule
slip that officials attribute to short-term technology deviations
affecting size, weight, and power requirements for the radio sets.
Further, the program entered product development with an ambitious
schedule that program officials recognized as high risk. In particular,
the program has a compressed test and evaluation phase that leaves little
room for error and rework.
We also recently reported that the TSAT program entered into product
development with only one of its six critical technologies sufficiently
mature. The remaining five technologies are not expected to reach maturity
until 2006. Backup technologies exist for three of the five immature
technologies, but they would degrade system performance. The other
technology-single access laser communications-has no backup and program
officials indicated any delay in maturing this technology
24 GAO has conducted a body of work on best practices and found that
programs managed within a knowledge-based approach-where levels of product
knowledge are demonstrated at critical points during development-are
better positioned to deliver superior performance within cost and schedule
estimates. For example, a match between program requirements and resources
(mature technology, time, and funding) at the start of product development
is particularly important. A high level of technology, time, and funding)
at the start of product development is particularly important. A high
level of technology maturity means that the technologies needed to meet
essential product requirements have been demonstrated in their intended
environment.
would cause the first satellite launch date to slip significantly. DOD
believes it has adequate measures to mitigate these risks, however,
concern over TSAT technology readiness led the Air Force to schedule an
interim review for November 2004, which will determine whether the
program's technology development has progressed sufficiently or whether
alternative action should be taken.
Similar risks extend to the systems that must be integrated with the GIG
and on which DOD is dependent for achieving its vision for netcentric
warfare. For example, our review of the Future Combat Systems determined
that the program is at significant risk, in part because more than 75
percent of its critical technologies were immature at the start of
development and many will not be sufficiently mature until the production
decision.25 First prototypes for the systems that make up the Future
Combat Systems will not be delivered until just before the production
decision, and full demonstration of the Future Combat Systems' ability to
work and meet its goals will not occur until after production has begun.
If the lessons learned from best practices and the experiences of past
programs have any bearing, the Future Combat Systems program is likely to
encounter "late-cycle churn," a phrase used by private industry to
describe the discovery of significant problems late in development and the
resulting search for fixes when costs are high and time is short.
Networking, network management, and secure network management challenges
are considerable.26 Currently, mobile networking is limited, mainly to
narrowband, fixed infrastructures, and relatively stable user groups. The
GIG network will require new wideband waveforms that can handle the
expected high data rates, throughput of information, and ability to
transmit integrated voice, data, and video simultaneously. In addition,
dynamic networking capabilities that can automatically adjust to changing
circumstances, such as intrusions or node failures, are needed; however,
25 U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Acquisitions: The Army's Future
Combat Systems' Features, Risks, and Alternatives, GAO-04-635T
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 1, 2004).
26 GAO has defined five categories of cybersecurity controls: (1) access
control; (2) system integrity; (3) cryptography; (4) audit and monitoring;
and (5) configuration management and assurance, that can help as
safeguards and countermeasures to protect agencies' information technology
networks such as the GIG network. Agencies such as DOD can use network
management to control and monitor networks to obtain status data from
components, make configuration changes, and alert network managers to
problems. See U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Security:
Technologies to Secure Federal Systems, GAO-04-467 (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
9, 2004).
the scalability of network management technologies for a network like the
GIG with such a large number of nodes is unproven. To facilitate timely
and prioritized access to information from a wide variety of sources, the
network will require enhanced quality of service mechanisms and algorithms
to manage bandwidth allocation and handle the flow of information and
security. Furthermore, advances will be needed in several other
technological areas, such as antennas, power sources, and the
miniaturization of components to facilitate mobile communications. For
example, current antennas do not support all of the portions of the radio
frequency spectrum where the GIG network will operate and are limited to
specific communications waveforms. Advanced multiband antennas will be
needed to support mobile and simultaneous communications across different
portions of the spectrum.
Integrating other elements of the network will also be challenging. The
increased bandwidth capability provided by the GIG-BE program may not be
fully realized if the military services and defense agencies do not use
compatible technologies and protocols in upgrading their networks. Even if
the technologies and protocols are compatible, bandwidth may be limited if
these networks are not properly designed and integrated to manage voice,
data, and imagery transmissions. Network management policies may pose
challenges if common agreement cannot be reached across the military
services and defense agencies on standards and information assurance
requirements. For example, DOD and the intelligence community have not yet
reached agreement on how they will exchange information and verify
security credentials on the GIG network.
Information assurance itself may be one of the most critical challenges
facing DOD. While building a network based on Internet protocols is
expected by DOD to provide a more viable path to achieve interoperability
and enable more dynamic and flexible information sharing, it also exposes
DOD to the same vulnerabilities that face all users of the Internet, and
it increases the opportunity for potential attackers with limited
knowledge and technical skills to cause a great deal of damage.
Establishing network and system security safeguards-such as firewalls,
identifying the sender and recipient of information, protecting
information from unauthorized access, and safeguarding data to prevent
accidental and deliberate alterations-will be essential but difficult
given the size the network and the thousands of systems and users that
will be linked to it.
Moreover, if the network is to be used to provide warfighters on the move
with access to intelligence and other sensitive information on demand,
information will need to be encrypted to safeguard data from misuse.27
However, the technologies needed to secure communications, such as
software programmable encryption devices are still in their infancy.
Further, the complexity and magnitude of enabling hundreds of systems and
applications to operate in a secure, Web-based environment will require
careful planning and coordination. Comprehensive plans will be needed to
ensure that sensitive data and communications are safeguarded across
diverse platforms. This will require DOD to identify sensitive data as
well as applications, databases, storage subsystems, and media used to
process and store the data. Once systems have been examined, data access
models must be applied to determine proper security levels for information
and how integration can occur across platforms without disrupting network
and near-real time operations. No one security solution likely will
address GIG requirements.
Lastly, the enterprise information services planned for the GIG pose
timing challenges. For example, in the near-term, DOD has established a
goal to complete the transition to Internet Protocol Version 6 by fiscal
year 2008. According DOD officials, the commercial industry may not be
able to provide the necessary products for Internet Protocol Version 6 by
the targeted milestone. Also, the transition will not be completed until a
Joint Staff developed set of performance and technical criteria can be
met. In addition, because of the enormous amount of data that will become
available, new data fusion methods will need to be developed to help users
rapidly identify, access, and make sense of available information.
DOD is depending on the GIG to enable a fundamental transformation in the
way military operations are conducted. While DOD's vision of the GIG is
compelling, the breadth and depth of the GIG and DOD's objectives for
netcentric warfare, present enormous challenges and risks-many of which
have not been successfully overcome in smaller-scale efforts and many of
which require significant changes in DOD's culture. Moreover, even though
DOD has begun to make heavy investments to implement the new network and
to ask the military services to accept its vision for the GIG, important
questions as to how DOD will make the GIG a reality and
27 Cryptographic transformation involves altering data into a form that
conceals that data's original meaning to prevent it from being known or
used.
Conclusions
how it will oversee progress as a whole and ensure the GIG is providing an
adequate return on DOD's investment are only just beginning to be
addressed, leaving DOD at risk of making investments that may not fit in
with its vision for the future. Moreover, many new weapon systems and
sensors, which are costing DOD tens of billions of dollars, are critically
dependent on the future network to successfully achieve their own
capabilities. Any disruptions in the schedule for key systems that support
the network, therefore, can have significant ramifications. As such, it is
important that DOD ensure it has sufficient knowledge about these systems
(e.g., requirements, technologies, security) as it makes additional
commitments to them and that it has effective risk mitigation plans to
ensure that they can deliver promised capability on time. Our future work,
therefore, will assess DOD's progress in addressing these challenges in
more depth as well as its progress in managing key acquisitions related to
the GIG.
Agency Comments DOD provided technical comments on a draft of this report
that we incorporated where appropriate.
We plan to provide copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration,
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics,
the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), the Director of the Defense
Information Systems Agency, and interested congressional committees.
We will make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the
report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact
me
at (202) 512-3519, Cristina Chaplain at (202) 512-4859, or John Oppenheim
at (202) 512-3111. Other individuals making key contributions to this
report are Lily Chin, Arturo Holguin, and Yvonne Vigil.
Robert E. Levin
Director
Acquisition and Sourcing Management
Appendix I: Policies, Standards, and Guidance to Implement the Global
Information Grid
Table 5: Selected Global Information Grid Policies, Standards, and
Guidance (2000 to 2004)
Policy/guidance Key Objectives
Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, August 24, 2000
(No. 4-8460)
Subject: DOD CIO Guidance and Policy on GIG Networks This policy
establishes the Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) as DOD's
networking capability for the transfer of information in support of
military operation in the context of the Global Information Grid (GIG). It
further specifies that DISN shall be the means for wide-area and
metropolitan-area networking unless granted a waiver through the DISN/GIG
waiver board.
Department of Defense Directive
8000.1, February 27, 2002
Subject: Management of DOD Information Resources and Information
Technology
This directive establishes policies for DOD information resources
management, including information technology, and delineates, authorities,
duties, and responsibilities for DOD information resources management
activities. It also provides direction on establishing Chief Information
Officers at various levels.
Department of Defense Instruction This instruction implements an approach
that considers both materiel (acquisition or 4630.8, May 2, 2002
procurement) and nonmateriel (doctrine, organizational, training,
leadership, and
personnel) aspects to ensure life-cycle interoperability and
supportability of information Subject: Procedures for Interoperability
technology and national security systems throughout DOD. It also
implements an and Supportability of Information outcome-based, mission
area focused process whereby information technology and Technology and
National Security national security systems interoperability and
supportability requirements for new, Systems modified, and fielded systems
are documented, coordinated, implemented, verified, and
approved to achieve an integrated, and secure information technology and
national security systems infrastructure supporting global operations
across the peace-conflict spectrum.
Department of Defense Directive 8100.1, The directive states that the GIG
shall support all DOD missions with information September 19, 2002
technology, for national security systems, joint operations, joint task
force, and/or Subject: GIG Overarching Policy combined-task for commands
in a manner that offers the most effective, efficient, and
assured information handling capabilities available, consistent with
national military strategy, operational requirements, and best-value
enterprise-level business practices.
Department of Defense Directive 8500.1, October 24, 2002
Subject: Information Assurance
Department of Defense Instruction
8500.2, February 6, 2003
Subject: Information Assurance Implementation
Department of Defense
Memorandum, July 7, 2003
Subject: End-to-End Information Assurance for the Global Information Grid
Department of Defense Memorandum, September 29, 2003
Subject: Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Interim Transition Guidance
The policy assigns responsibilities to achieve DOD information assurance
through a defense-in-depth approach that integrates the capabilities of
personnel, operations, and technology, and supports the evolution to
network-centric warfare.
The instructions implements policy, assigns responsibilities, and
prescribes procedures for applying integrated, layered protection of the
DOD information systems and networks referenced in DOD Directive 8500.1.
The policy establishes a goal to converge voice, video, and data traffic
over DOD's internetwork and the National Security Agency (NSA) as lead in
developing the information assurance component of the GIG architecture.
The policy establishes a goal of transitioning all DOD networking to the
next generation of Internet Protocol, IPv6, by fiscal year 2008. As part
of this transition, the strategy will be to minimize costs by ensuring
products and systems procured, acquired, or in development after October
1, 2003, are capable of operating in IPv6 networks.
Appendix I: Policies, Standards, and Guidance to Implement the Global
Information Grid
Policy/guidance Key Objectives
Department of Defense, Office of the Chief Information Officer Memorandum,
October 24, 2003
Subject: DOD Net-Centric Data Strategy The policy establishes a DOD-wide
goal to institutionalize the practice of identifying all data assets on
the GIG by fiscal year 2008. Information will be provided on each data
asset to standardize the way data are described and used for all IT and
national security systems. This practice will enable DOD to create tools
to query data assets across platforms.
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Memorandum, November 10, 2003
Subject: GIG Enterprise Services Implementation
The policy establishes a program to begin the development of core
enterprise services within the GIG as part of the fiscal year 2006 program
review process. Core enterprise services-such as messaging, collaboration,
services management, security, discovery, and mediation-are to be
developed to provide access and the delivery of data and services across
the department.
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff This instruction establishes polices
and procedures for developing, evaluating and Instruction providing
interoperability and supportability certification in support of the Joint
Capabilities CJCSI 6212.01C, November 20, 2003 Integration and Development
System for acquisition category, nonacquisition category
and fielded capabilities. Subject: Interoperability and Supportability of
Information Technology and National Security Systems
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff This instruction establishes the
policies and procedures of the Joint Capabilities Instruction Integration
and Development System. Procedures established in this instruction support
CJCSI 3170.01D, March 12, 2004 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council in
identifying, assessing, and prioritizing joint military capability needs.
Subject: Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development Systems
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Memorandum, March 22, 2004
Subject: Information Technology Portfolio Management
Department of Defense Directive
8100.2, April 14, 2004
Subject: Use of Commercial Wireless Devices, Services, and Technologies in
the Department of Defense Global Information Grid This policy assigns
responsibilities for managing information technology investments as
portfolios. It also establishes that decisions on what information
technology investments to make, modify or terminate shall be based on
architectures, risk tolerance levels, potential returns, outcome goals,
and performance.
This policy assigns responsibilities for the use of commercial wireless
devices, services, and technologies in the DOD Global Information Grid. It
also directs the development and use of a knowledge management process to
promote the sharing of wireless technology capabilities, vulnerabilities,
and vulnerability mitigation strategies throughout DOD and promotes joint
interoperability using open standards throughout DOD for commercial
wireless services, devices, and technological implementations.
Department of Defense Directive The directive updates DOD responsibilities
for interoperability and supportability of 4630.5, May 5, 2004 information
technology, including national security systems, and implements DOD Chief
Information Officer's responsibilities. It also defines a
capability-focused, effects-based Subject: Interoperability and
Supportability approach to advance information technology and national
security systems of Information Technology and National interoperability
and supportability across DOD and establishes the Net-Ready KeySecurity
Systems Performance Parameter to assess net-ready attributes required for
both the technical
exchange of information and the end-to-end operational effectiveness of
that exchange.
Sources: DOD (data); GAO (analysis).
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Show What DOD document directs the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?116-283, § 809. The JROC, established in statute, is a body within DOD that supports the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in advising the Secretary of Defense on military capabilities required to support the national military strategy.
What are JCIDS documents?The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), is the formal United States Department of Defense (DoD) process which defines acquisition requirements and evaluation criteria for future defense programs.
What is the role of the JCIDS document sponsor?The Sponsors responsibilities are to make affordability determinations, develop JCIDS documentation, develop a Capability Development Document (CDD), Capability Production Document (CPD), or joint DCR, resolve issues that arise during the staffing, certification, and validation processes, and coordinate with sponsors, ...
What is a capability requirements document?A current-practice collection of operational requirements addressing the needs of exactly one developmental spiral or increment. Contrast with its predecessor, the ORD.
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